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Abstract
The author questions whether concurrent and simultaneous moral and normative commit-
ments to Islam and to a democratic form of government are reconcilable or mutually exclusive.
The author will argue in this Article that it is indeed possible to reconcile Islam with a commitment
in favor of democracy. The author will then present a systematic exploration of Islamic theology
and law as it relates to a democratic system of government, and in this context, address the various
elements within Islamic belief and practice that promote, challenge, or hinder the emergence of
an ideological commitment in favor of democracy. In many ways, the basic and fundamental ob-
jective of this Article is to investigate whether the Islamic faith is consistent or reconcilable with a
democratic faith. As addressed below, both Islam and democracy represent a set of comprehensive
and normative moral commitments and beliefs about, among other things, the worth and entitle-
ments of human beings. The challenging issue is to understand the ways in which the Islamic and
democratic systems of convictions and moral commitments could undermine, negate, or validate
and support each other.
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The question I deal with here is whether concurrent and
simultaneous moral and normative commitments to Islam and to
a democratic form of government are reconcilable or mutually
exclusive. I will argue in this Article that it is indeed possible to
reconcile Islam with a commitment in favor of democracy. I will
present a systematic exploration of Islamic theology and law as it
relates to a democratic system of government, and in this con-
text, I will address the various elements within Islamic belief and
practice that promote, challenge, or hinder the emergence of an
ideological commitment in favor of democracy. In many ways,
the basic and fundamental objective of this Article is to investi-
gate whether the Islamic faith is consistent or reconcilable with a
democratic faith. As addressed below, both Islam and democ-
racy represent a set of comprehensive and normative moral com-
mitments and beliefs about, among other things, the worth and
entitlements of human beings. The challenging issue is to un-
derstand the ways in which the Islamic and democratic systems
of convictions and moral commitments could undermine, ne-
gate, or validate and support each other. At the outset of this
Article, I make no apologies for my conviction that separate and
independent commitments in favor of Islam and in favor of de-
mocracy are morally desirable and normatively good. The prob-
lem is to facilitate the co-existence of both of these desirable
moral commitments and, to the extent possible, to guard against
a situation in which the one challenges and negates the other.
As discussed below, in my view, reconciliation, and perhaps co-
operation, between Islam and democracy is challenging but ab-
solutely necessary.
* Dr. Khaled Abou El Fadl was recently appointed by President Bush as a Commis-
sioner to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom. Dr. El Fadl is a
Visiting Professor of Law at Yale Law School and Professor of Law at the University of
California, Los Angeles. He is one of the leading authorities on Islamic law in the
United States and Europe. He holds a B.A. from Yale University, aJ.D. from the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School, and an M.A./Ph.D. from Princeton University. Dr. El
Fadl is grateful to his wife Grace, for her invaluable feedback and assistance, and would
also like to thank Anver Emon, his research assistant, for his diligent work on this pa-
per.
ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT 5
At the very outset of this Article, the first issue that ought to
be addressed is the ideal form of government in Islam. A jurist
writing a few centuries ago on the subject of Islam and systems of
government would have commenced his treatise by separating
all political systems into three broad types.' The first system is a
natural system that approximates a primitive state of nature.
This is an uncivilized system of lawlessness and anarchy, in which
the most powerful in society dominate and tyrannize the rest.2
In such a system, instead of law, there would be custom, and
instead of government, there would be tribal elders who are
respected and obeyed only as long as they remained the strong-
est and most physically able.' The second system is dynastic.
Such a system is based not on custom, but on laws issued by a
king or prince.4 According to Muslim jurists, such a system
would be illegitimate as well.5 Because the king or prince is the
source of law, the system is considered baseless, whimsical, and
capricious.6 In such a system, people obey laws out of necessity
or compulsion, but the laws themselves are illegitimate and ty-
rannical.7 The third system, and the most superior, is the Cali-
phate, which is based on Shari'ah law.8 Shari'ah law, according
to Muslim jurists, fulfills the criteria of justice and legitimacy,
and it binds the governed and governor alike.' Because the gov-
ernment is bound by a higher law that may not be altered or
changed, and because the government may not act whimsically
or outside the pale of law, the Caliphate system is superior to any
other. 10
Many Muslim scholars, like Ibn Khaldun, consistently made
the same assumption: the Islamic political system was consid-
ered a challenge to the world."1 While all other polities are
doomed to despotic governance, and their laws are individualis-
1. See, e.g., MUHSIN MAHDI, IBN KHALDUN'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 193-201 (1964).
2. See id. at 261-63.
3. See id. at 196.
4. See id. at 206-09.
5. See id. at 251.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 237-48.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 284; NIZAM BARAKAT, MUQADDIMA FI AL-FIKR AL-SIYASI AL-ISLAMI 1 19
(Jami'at al-Malik Su'ud 1985).
11. See MAHDI, supra note 1, at 284.
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tic and whimsical, the Caliphate system of governance is superior
because it is based on the rule of law. 12 Whether as a matter of
historical practice this assumption was justified or not, the mate-
rial point was that classical Muslim jurists exhibited a distinct
aversion to whimsical or unrestrained goverance. A government
bound by Shari'ah was considered meritorious in part because it
is a government where human beings do not have unfettered
authority over other human beings, and because there are limits
on the reach of power. For instance, a Sunni jurist such as Abu
al-Faraj Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/1200) asserted that a Caliph who
tries to alter God's laws for politically expedient reasons is im-
plicitly accusing the Shari'ah of imperfection."t Ibn al-Jawzi
elaborated upon this by contending that, without the rule of
Shari'ah, a ruler may justify the murder of innocent Muslims
under the guise of political expediency or interests. In reality,
he argued, no political interest could ever justify the killing of a
Muslim without legitimate legal cause, and it is this type of re-
straint that demonstrates the superiority of a Shari'ah system
over the other two alternative systems of governance. 14
This classical debate is rather fascinating for several reasons.
It is fair to say that in the contemporary age, the challenge of
good governance is posed most aptly by a democratic system of
government, and not simply by limited or restrained govern-
ment. In espousing the principle of limited government and the
rule of law, classical Muslim scholars were, in fact, asserting prin-
12. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAw (2001)
[hereinafter EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE]; ABU YA'LA MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HusAYN
IBN AL-FARRA', AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYAH 28 (1983) [hereinafter AL-FARRA']; 1 H.A.R.
GIBB, Constitutional Organization, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF ISLAMIC LAw (Majid Khadduri & HerbertJ. Liebesny eds., 1955); YUsuF IBISH,
NusUs AL-FIKR AL-SIYASI AL ISLAMI: AL-hMAMAH 'INDA AL-SUNNAH 55 (1966); ANN KATHE-
RINE SWYNFORD LA.MBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM: AN INTRODUC-
TION To THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY: THE JURISTS 19 (1981); 'ALl IBN
MUHAMMAD MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AL SULTANIYAH WA-AL-WILAYAT AL-DINIYAH 19-21 (Mus-
tafa al-Halabi 1985) [hereinafter MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM); HANNA MIKHAIL, POLITICS AND
REVELATION: MAWARDI AND AFTER 20-21 (1995); MUHAMMAD JALAL ABU AL-FUTUH SHA-
RAF & 'ALl 'ABD AL-MU'TI MUHAMMAD, AL-FIKR AL-SIYASI FI AL-ISLAM: SHAKHSIYAT WA-
MADHAHIB 399 (Dar al-Jam'at al-Misriyya 1978); W. MONTGOMERY 'WATT, ISLAMIC POLITI-
CAL THOUGHT: THE BASIC CONCEPTS 102-03 (1968).
13. See ABU AL-FARAJ 'ABD AL-RAHMAN IBN 'ALl IBN AL-JAWZI, AL-SHIFA' Fl MAWA'IZ AL-
MULUK WA-AL-KHULAFA' 55 (Fu'ad Ahmad ed., Dar al-Da'wa 1985) [hereinafter AL
SHIFA']; I AL-JAWZI, AL-MISBAH AL-MUDI' Fl AL-KHILAFAT AL-MUSTADI' 298 (Ibrahim Najiyya
ed., Matba'at al-Avqaf 1979) [hereinafter AL-MISBAH].
14. See AL-SHIFA', supra note 13, at 55, 57; AL-MISBAH, supra note 13, at 298.
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ciples that are at the core of all democratic practices in the mod-
ern world. But it is important to recognize that the idea of lim-
ited government, alone, is no longer in this day and age, suffi-
cient for proving the merit of a particular system of government.
Today, the system of government that has the strongest and
most compelling claim to legitimacy, and moral virtue, is a de-
mocracy. The mere fact that, with very few exceptions, every des-
potic regime in the world today claims to be more democratic,
and less authoritarian, is powerful evidence of the challenge de-
mocracies pose to the world. Most authoritarian governments
claim to be popular with the people they rule over, and attempt
to conceal the appearance of despotism and arbitrariness, but in
doing so they also tacitly affirm the primacy and moral superior-
ity of the democratic paradigm in the modern age. Although
limited government and the rule of law are necessary for the es-
tablishment of a democratic order, these are not the elements
that give a democracy its moral and persuasive power. The legiti-
macy of a democratic order is founded on the idea that the citi-
zens of a Nation are the sovereign and that a democratic govern-
ment gives effect to the will of that sovereign through represen-
tation. As such, the people are the source of the law, and the law
is founded on the basis of fundamental rights that protect the
basic well-being and interests of the individual members of the
sovereign. Whether there is a written constitution or not, ac-
cording to democratic theory, there must be a process through
which the sovereign may guard and protect its rights and also
shape the law.
As far as Islam is concerned, democratic theory poses a for-
midable challenge. Put simply, if Muslim jurists considered law
derived from a sovereign monarch to be inherently illegitimate
and whimsical, what is the legitimacy of a system in which the law
is derived from a sovereign, but where the sovereign is made up
of the citizens of a Nation? The brunt of the challenge to Islam
is: If God is the only sovereign and source of law in Islam, is it
meaningful to speak of a democracy within Islam, or even of Is-
lam within a democracy, and can an Islamic system of govern-
ment ever be reconciled with democratic governance?
Struggling to answer this question is an endeavor fraught
with conceptual and political pitfalls. On the one hand, arguing
that constitutionalism and Islamic political doctrines are compat-
ible immediately raises the problem of historical and cultural
2003]
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anachronism. How can a modern concept reflecting values that
evolved over centuries within a particular cultural context be
sought in a remarkably different context? In many ways, democ-
racy cannot be theorized, but must be practiced through a cul-
ture that tolerates others, accepts disagreement, is amenable to
change, and values the process, quite often regardless of the re-
sults it generates. On the other hand, denying that Islamic polit-
ical doctrines could support a democratic order implies that
Muslims are doomed to suffer despotism, unless they either
abandon or materially alter their traditions. Furthermore, cul-
ture can be reconstructed and re-invented partly through the
power of ideas, and if ideas are lacking, there is never really a
possibility of a systematic or directed cultural change.
Therefore, any time one portends to discuss whether Islam
and democracy are compatible, one is also taking an implicit
normative stance. This is so because both Islam and democracy
are conceptual frameworks anchored in systems of commitment
and belief. Both require a conviction and a conscientious dedi-
cation without which they cannot really exist. In the same way
that it is possible to perform Islamic rituals without ever being a
believing Muslim, it is also possible to have all the trappings and
processes of a democracy without ever creating a democracy. It
is possible for a country to have a Constitution, parliament, judi-
ciary, elections, and other institutions of democracy, without be-
ing democratic.1 5 Similarly, it is possible for a government to
implement the rules and regulations of Islamic law without be-
ing, in any real sense, Islamic.1 6 What defines either a democ-
racy or Islam are the moral values that one associates with either
one of these systems of belief, and the attitudinal commitments
of their adherents. I say this because, in my view, the broad tra-
dition of Islamic political thought contains ideas and institutions
that could potentially support or undermine a democratic order.
There are trajectories or potentialities found in historical Islamic
doctrines that could be utilized to promote or oppose a demo-
cratic system of government. However, saying this is akin to as-
15. Cases in point would be many developing countries that have all the formal
trappings of democracies, but do not lead a democratic life.
16. A case in point would be Saudi Arabia, where many purported Islamic laws are
in effect, but the government fails to embody most Islamic virtues or moralities. See
Glenn E. Robinson, Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case ofJordan, in 51 MIDDLE E.J. 373,
379 (1997).
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serting that there are raw materials that could be utilized to man-
ufacture finished products. Without will power, inspired vision,
and moral commitment, these raw materials remain of little use.
Similarly, regardless of the doctrinal potentialities found in the
Islamic tradition, without the necessary moral commitment, and
conscientious understanding, there can be no democracy in Is-
lam. At least for Muslims for whom Islam is the authoritative
frame of reference, they must develop a conviction that democ-
racy is an ethical good and that the pursuit of this good does not
constitute an abandonment of Islam.
I. ISLAM AND THE MORAL COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY
Should Muslims strive towards a democratic system of gov-
ernment, and if so, why? Any honest approach to the issue
should start with these basic questions. Arguably, Muslims might
legitimately prefer a system of government that submits to the
Divine will, instead of abiding by the vagaries of human whim-
sies. Conceding sovereignty to God is more virtuous than ac-
cepting the sovereignty of human beings, and in fact, the very
idea of human sovereignty smacks of self-idolatry. In addition,
one might even contend that some Muslims seek to establish a
democratic system of governance only because of their infatua-
tion with everything Western, instead of choosing to hold
steadfast to what is legitimately and authentically Islamic.
These are formidable questions, but I believe they are also
the wrong ones. The Qur'an did not specify a particular form of
government, but it did identify social and political values that are
central to a Muslim polity, and it urged Muslims to pursue and
fulfill these values. Among such values ordained by the Qur'an
are: the promotion of social cooperation and mutual assistance
in pursuit of justice,17 the establishment of a consultative and
non-autocratic method of governance, 8 and the institutionaliza-
tion of mercy and compassion in social interactions.1 9 There-
fore, it would stand to reason that Muslims ought to adopt the
system of government that is the most effective in helping Mus-
lims promote the pertinent moral values. In this regard, it could
17. QUR'AN 11:119; 49:13.
18. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (referring to the concept of govern-
ment through shura).
19. QUR'AN 6:12, 54, 21, 107; 27:77; 29:51; 45:20.
2003]
10 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
be plausibly argued that democracy is the most effective system
for doing so. If Muslims are convinced that democracy is the
best available means for serving the moral purposes of their re-
ligion, it hardly seems relevant that democracy is a Western, or
non-Western idea. What is relevant is the existence of a convic-
tion and belief in the merits of a democratic system, as opposed
to any other possible system, and a commitment to the fostering
and promotion of such a system through the moral venues facili-
tated by Islamic law and ethics.
In my view, there are several reasons that commend democ-
racy, and especially a constitutional democracy, as the system
most capable of promoting the ethical and moral imperatives of
Islam. These reasons are elaborated upon below, but in essence,
I would argue that a democracy offers the greatest potential for
promoting justice, and protecting human dignity, without mak-
ing God responsible for human injustice or the infliction of deg-
radation by human beings upon one another. As I have argued
elsewhere, authoritarianism, if inflicted in the name of religion,
is a transgression upon the bounds of God. Authoritarianism al-
lows despots to usurp the Divine prerogative by empowering
some human beings to play the role of God.2 0 In order to avoid
having a small group of people appointing themselves as the
voice of God, and speaking in God's name, there are two main
options: 1) Either we ought to deny everyone the authority to
speak on God's behalf; or 2) we endow everyone with that au-
thority. The former option is problematic because the Qur'an
provides that God has vested all of humanity with divinity by
making all human beings the viceroys of God on this earth; the
latter is problematic because a person that does good cannot be
morally equated with a person who does evil - for instance, a
saint does not have the same moral worth as a serial killer.
A constitutional democracy avoids the problem by enshrin-
ing some basic moral standards in a constitutional document,
and thus, guarantees some discernment and differentiation, but,
at the same time, a democracy insures that no single person or
group becomes the infallible representative of divinity. In addi-
20. See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD KNOWS THE SOLDIERS: THE Au-
THORITATVE AND AUTHORITARIAN IN ISLAMIC DISCOURSES (2001) [hereinafter THE
SOLDIERS]; KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD'S NAME: ISLAMIC LAw, AUTHORITY
AND WOMEN (2001) [hereinafter SPEAKING IN GOD'S NAME].
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tion, a democratic system offers the greatest possibility for ac-
countability and resistance to the tendency of the powerful to
render themselves immune from judgment. This is consistent
with the imperative of justice in Islam. If in a political system,
there are no institutional mechanisms to prevent the unjust
from rendering themselves above judgment, then the system is
itself unjust, regardless of whether injustice is actually committed
or not. For instance, if there is a system in which there is no
punishment for rape, this system is unjust, quite apart from
whether that crime is ever committed or not. A democracy -
through the institutions of the vote, separation and division of
power, and guarantee of pluralism - at least offers the possibil-
ity of redress, and that, in and of itself, is a moral good.
There are several other reasons for commending a constitu-
tional democracy as the system most consistent with Islamic
moral imperatives. I will explore these reasons below, but first it
is important to acknowledge that regardless of the practical mer-
its identified, there are serious conceptual challenges to a demo-
cratic commitment in Islam. The principle challenges are the
religious law of Shari'ah, and the idea that the people, as the
sovereign, can be free to flout or violate Shari'ah law. To under-
stand these challenges, we must delve into the epistemology of
Shari'ah, and the meaning of God's sovereignty. The problem,
however, has been that in contemporary Islam there has not
been a serious and systematic effort to evaluate either the con-
cept of sovereignty or Shari'ah, as each may relate to modern
political systems.
The dominant Muslim responses to the challenge of democ-
racy tend to be either apologetic and defensive or nationalistic
and rejectionist, but both responses remain largely reactive.
Muslim apologists tend to claim that democracy already exists in
Islam, primarily as a means of emphasizing the compatibility of
Islam with modernity. Typically, they maintain that the Qur'an
is the functional equivalent of a Constitution, and they also tend
to recast the early history of Islam as if it were an ideal demo-
cratic experience. Apologists defend the public image of Is-
lam by indulging in anachronisms, often pretending as if the
Prophet was sent to humanity to teach it the art of democratic
governance. Therefore, they would declare the fundamental
compatibility between Islam and democracy as a conclusion to
be accepted as a matter of faith and belief, rather than as a pro-
2003]
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position to be argued and proven. Importantly, however, this
assumption was not the product of a moral commitment to de-
mocracy, but rather was the result of a keen interest in power. A
democratic Islam was simply the vehicle by which they sought to
empower themselves against the onslaught of various competing
political forces, and Islam was also the means by which they
sought to bid for domination over others. This is why many of
the apologists are affiliated with some religio-political movement
in the Muslim world, for instance, like the Muslim Brotherhood
movement in Egypt. This is also why we find that the political
practices of the apologists do not reflect the type of ethical vir-
tues associated with democratic thought, such as tolerance of dis-
sent, or valuing intellectual and cultural diversity. For example,
we find that many of the American-Muslim organizations which
consistently affirm the compatibility of Islam with democracy
are, in fact, quite despotic both in their internal dynamics, and
in the type of theology to which they adhere. For these organiza-
tions, democracy is affirmed politically, but it is not believed or
internalized ethically.2
The second main response in modern Islam insists that the
Islamic political system is different and unique, and argues that
such a system might overlap with a democracy in some regards
and might depart on others. The main emphasis of this ap-
proach is on cultural or intellectual independence and auton-
omy, and therefore, any attempt to commit to a democratic sys-
tem of government is seen as a sign of surrender to what is called
the Western intellectual or cultural invasion of the Muslim
world. For instance, the Pakistani propagandist Abu al-A 'la al-
Mawdudi contended that the Islamic system of government is a
theo-democracy, which, he insisted, is very different from either
a theocracy or a democracy.22 In addition, adherents of this ap-
proach frequently proclaim that the political system of Islam is a
shura government, which they claim has nothing to do with a
21. For instance, after writing a regular column for many years in an Islamic maga-
zine, my column was suddenly terminated and my work banned because I disagreed
with the leadership of the organization that publishes the magazine. Not surprisingly,
this organization tirelessly proclaims the democratic nature of Islam, and even claims
that the Prophet was a philosopher of democracy. But apologetic stances such as this
often translate into a hypocritical despotism in actual practice.
22. See ABt AL-A 'LA AL-MAWDUDI, AL-KIHiLAFA WA-AL MULK 13-21 (Ahmad Idris
trans., Dar al-Qalam 1978).
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democratic system of government. Like the apologist approach,
this trend is largely reactive in the sense that it defines itself
solely by reference to the perceived "other." According to this
orientation, an Islamic system cannot be democratic simply be-
cause the West is democratic. But, rather inconsistently, the par-
tisans of this approach often spend a considerable amount of
energy trying to prove that Western democracies are hypocriti-
cal, and that they are not democracies at all. It is as if they see
the merits of a democracy, but, out of a blind sense of nationalis-
tic tribalism, insist that the West does not really have democracy,
and that Muslims ought not to pursue it. Importantly, however,
what the adherents of this approach claim to be essential to an
Islamic political system is as alien, or indigenous, to Islam as is a
democratic system of government. In other words, the adher-
ents of this approach construct a reactive symbolism of what an
Islamic system ought to be, but such symbolism is not necessarily
derived from any genuine and authentic Islamic historical expe-
rience. It is wholly and completely derived from what they be-
lieve the "other" is not, and, consequently, that derived construct
is as much of a historical anachronism as is a democratic vision
of the Prophet and his companions' polity. It is fair to say that
the adherents of this orientation are far more anti-Western than
they are pro-Islamic.
The dominance of the apologetic or rejectionist orienta-
tions throughout the Colonial and post-Colonial eras in Islam
have resulted in the stunting of the Islamic creative impulse to-
wards the challenge of democracy. Is Islam compatible with de-
mocracy? The response can only be that it depends on whether
there are a sufficient number of Muslims willing to commit to
the democratic ideal and to undertake the type of critical re-
appraisal of Islamic theology and law in order to give full effect
to this commitment. Thus far, most of the efforts at achieving
this have been on largely functionalist and opportunistic
grounds that, if anything, ultimately discredit the very idea of
reform within Islam. Overwhelmingly, contemporary Muslim re-
formers have attempted to justify a democracy in Islam solely on
the grounds of maslaha [public interest]. Typically, such reform-
ers are satisfied with asserting that most of Islamic law may be
changed to serve the public interests of Muslims, and they jump
from that assertion to the conclusion that the adoption of de-
mocracy ought not pose any serious obstacles because of the pri-
2003]
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macy of deference to public interest in Islamic jurisprudence.
The fact is that such reformers tend to come from the ranks of
people who have nothing more than the most superficial famili-
arity with the epistemology and methodology of Islamic jurispru-
dence. In addition, the logic of public interest is like a harlot: it
offers its services, as effectively as possible, to democrats and des-
pots alike. Amongst the often opportunistic logic of reformers,
the obstinacy of rejectionists, and the insincerity of apologists,
the possibilities for a democracy within Islam have not been seri-
ously explored. The balance of this Article will focus on the pos-
sibilities offered by the intellectual heritage of Islam, and will
also point out the issues that pose the greatest challenge to Mus-
lims willing to make a commitment to democracy.
II. GOD AS THE SOVEREIGN
I will discuss the issue of political representation below, but
at this point, it is important to start exploring the idea of God as
the sovereign lawmaker in an Islamic State, and whether such a
paradigm is consistent with a democratic system of government.
Interestingly, early in Islamic history, the issue of God's domin-
ion or sovereignty in the political sphere [hakimiyyat Allah] was
raised by a group known as the Haruriyya (later known as the
Khawarij) when they rebelled against the fourth Rightly-Guided
Caliph 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib (d. 40/661). Initially, the Haruriyya
were firm supporters of 'Ali, but they rebelled against him when
he agreed to arbitrate his political dispute with a competing po-
litical faction led by a man named Mu'awiya. Ultimately, the ef-
fort at reaching a peaceful resolution to the political conflict was
a failure, and, after 'Ali's death, Mu'awiya was able to seize power
and establish himself as the first Caliph of the Umayyad Dynasty.
At the time of the arbitration, however, the Khawarij, who were
pious, puritan, and fanatic, believed that God's law clearly sup-
ported 'Ali and, therefore, an arbitration or any negotiated set-
tlement was inherently unlawful. The Khawarij maintained that
the Shari'ah clearly and unequivocally supported 'Ali's claim to
power, and that any attempt at a negotiated settlement, in effect,
challenged the rule of God and God's sovereignty or dominion,
and therefore, by definition, was illegitimate.
Ironically, 'Ali himself had agreed to the arbitration on the
condition that the arbitrators be bound by the Qur'an, and that
[Vol. 27:4
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they would give full consideration to the supremacy of the
Shari'ah. However, in 'Ali's mind, this did not necessarily pre-
clude the possibility of a negotiated settlement, let alone the law-
fulness of resorting to arbitration as a way of resolving the dis-
pute. In the view of the Khawarij, by accepting the principle of
arbitration and by accepting the notion that legality could be
negotiated, 'Ali had lost his claim to legitimacy because he trans-
ferred God's dominion to human beings. 'Ali's behavior, ac-
cording to the Khawarij, had shown that he was willing to com-
promise God's supremacy by transferring decision making to
human actors instead of faithfully applying the law of God. Not
surprisingly, the Khawarij declared 'Ali a traitor to God, rebelled
against him, and eventually succeeded in assassinating him. No-
tably, the Khawarij's rallying cries of "dominion belongs to God"
[ "la hukma illa li'llah "] and "the Qur'an is the judge" [ "al-hukmu
li'l-Qur'an"] are nearly identical to the slogans invoked by con-
temporary fundamentalist groups.2" But considering the histori-
cal context, the Khawarij's sloganeering was initially a call for the
symbolism of legality and the supremacy of law.24 This search
for legality quickly descended into an unequivocal radicalized
call for clear lines of demarcation between what is lawful and
unlawful.
The anecdotal reports about the debates between 'Ali and
the Khawarij regarding this matter reflect an unmistakable ten-
sion about the meaning of legality, and the implications of the
rule of law. In one such report, members of the Khawarij ac-
cused 'Ali of accepting the judgment and dominion [hakimiyya]
of human beings instead of abiding by the dominion of God's
law. Upon hearing of this accusation, 'Ali called upon the peo-
ple to gather around him, and he brought a large copy of the
Qur'an. 'Ali touched the Qur'an while instructing it to to in-
form the people about God's law. Surprised, the people gath-
23. Ironically, Shi'i and Sunni fundamentalist groups detest the Khawarij and con-
sider them heretics, but this is not because these modem groups disagree with the
Khawarij's political slogans, but because the Khawarij murdered 'Ali, the cousin of the
Prophet.
24. This claim is quite controversial for Muslims and non-Muslims, alike. Never-
theless, I believe that this argument is supported by the fact that the rebellion of the
Khawarij took place in the context of an overall search for legitimacy and legality after
the death of the Prophet. The research of some scholars on the dogma and symbolism
of the early rebellions lends support to this argument. See HICHEM DJAIT, AL-FITNAH:
JADALIY'AT AL-DIN WA-AL-SIYASAH F1 AL-ISLAM AL-MUBAKKIR (2d ed., al-Tab'ah 1989).
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ered around 'Ali exclaimed, "What are you doing?! The Qur'an
cannot speak, for it is not a human being." Upon hearing this,
'Ali exclaimed that this is exactly the point he is trying to make.
The Qur'an, 'Ali explained, is but ink and paper, and it does not
speak for itself. Instead, it is human beings who give effect to it
according to their limited personal judgments and opinions.25
Anecdotal stories such as these not only relate to the role of
human agency in interpreting the Divine word, but also symbol-
ize a search for the fundamental moral values of society. In
thinking about these moral values, it is important to differentiate
between the issues that are subject to political negotiation and
expedience, and issues that constitute unwavering matters of
principle and that are strictly governed by law. Furthermore,
one can discern in such reports a search for the proper legal
limits that may be placed upon a ruler's range of discretion. But
more importantly, they also point to the dogmatic superficiality
of proclamations of God's dominion or sovereignty in order to
legitimate and empower what are fundamentally human deter-
minations.
For a believer, God is thought of as all-powerful and as the
ultimate owner of the heavens and earth, but what are the impli-
cations of this claim for human agency in understanding and
implementing the law in a political system? As I argue below,
arguments claiming that God is the sole legislator and only
source of law engage in a fatal fiction that is not defensible from
the point of view of Islamic theology. Such arguments pretend
that human agents could possibly have perfect and unfettered
access to the will of God and also that human beings could possi-
bly become the mere executors of the Divine will, without in-
serting their own human subjectivities in the process. Further-
more, and more importantly, claims about God's sovereignty as-
sume that there is a Divine legislative will that seeks to regulate
all human interactions. This is always stated as an assumption,
instead of a proposition that needs to be argued and proven. As
discussed later, it is possible that God does not seek to regulate
all human affairs. It is also possible that God leaves it to human
beings to regulate their own affairs as long as they observe cer-
25. See 14 AHMAD IBN 'ALI IBN HAJAR AL-'ASQALANI, FATH AL-BAR! BI-SHARH AL-
BUKHARI 303 (Dar al-Fikr 1993); 7 MUHAMMAD IBN 'ALl SHAWKANI, NAYL AL-AWTAR:
SHARH MUNTAQA AL-AKHBAR MIN AHADITH SAVYID AL-AKHYAR 166 (Dar al-Hadith 1993).
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tain minimal standards of moral conduct and that such stan-
dards include the preservation and promotion of human dignity
and well-being.
According to the Qur'an, human beings are the vicegerents
of God, the inheritors of the earth, and the most valued inven-
tion of God's creation. In the Qur'anic discourse, God com-
manded creation to honor human beings because of the miracle
of the human intellect, which is the microcosm of the abilities of
the Divine itself. Arguably, the fact that God honored the mira-
cle of the human intellect and also honored the human being as
a symbol of divinity, is sufficient in and of itself to justify a moral
commitment to the values that are necessary for protecting and
preserving the integrity and dignity of that symbol of divinity.26
As I argue below, the fact that God is sovereign and creation is
God's dominion cannot be used as an excuse to escape the bur-
dens of human agency. Seen from a different perspective, the
notion of God's sovereignty can easily be exploited to overcome
and marginalize the agency of most human beings in conducting
the affairs of their polity. This will invariably mean, however,
that only an elite will rule in God's name while pretending to
implement the Divine will. This is fundamentally at odds with
the epistemology and methodologies of classical Islamic jurispru-
dence. As argued later, God's sovereignty is honored in the
search for the ways that human beings may be able to approxi-
mate the beauty and justice of God. It is also honored in the
attempt to preserve and safeguard the moral values that reflect
the attributes of the sublimity of the Divine. However, if God's
sovereignty is used to argue that the only legitimate source of law
is the Divine text and that human experience and intellect are
irrelevant and immaterial to the pursuit of the Divine will, then
the idea of Divine sovereignty will always stand as an instrument
of authoritarianism and an obstacle to democracy.27 I will fur-
26. According to the Qur'an, as a symbol of honor due to human beings, God
commanded the angels, who were incapable of sin, to prostrate before Adam. The
angels protested honoring a being that is capable of committing evil and causing mis-
chief. God conceded as much, but explained that the miracle of the intellect, in and of
itself, deserved to be honored, and that God had made human beings the vicegerents of
divinity. See FAZLtUR RAHIAN, MAJOR THEMES OF THE QUR'AN 17-18 (1994).
27. One of the most important, but also one of the most neglected, treatises was
written by a former chairman of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt, where
he effectively refuted Mawdudi's arguments on hakimiyya. Rather tellingly, the author's
arguments, despite their liberal implications, would have been far more persuasive to
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ther develop this argument below, but in order to make this ar-
gument more accessible, I will first lay a broader foundation for
Islamic legal and political doctrines.
III. THE POVERS OF THE RULER
If, as many Muslim fundamentalists and Western orientalists
contend, God's dominion or sovereignty means that God is the
sole legislator, then one would expect that a Caliph or Muslim
ruler would be treated as God's agent or representative. If God
is the only sovereign within a political system, then the ruler
ought to be appointed by the Divine sovereign and serve at His
pleasure. However, in the same way that the meaning and impli-
cations of God's sovereignty were the subject of an intense de-
bate in pre-modern Islam, so was the topic of the powers and
capacity of the ruler. It is well established, at least in Sunni Is-
lam, that the Prophet died without naming a successor to lead
the Muslim community. The Prophet intentionally left the
choice of leadership to the Muslim Nation as a whole.2" A state-
ment attributed to the Rightly Guided Caliph Abu Bakr asserts,
"God has left people to manage their own affairs so that they will
choose a leader who will serve their interests. ' 29 The word
khalifa [Caliph], the title given to the Muslim leader, literally
means the successor or deputy. Early on, Muslims debated
whether it was appropriate to name the leader the Caliph of God
[khalifat Allah], but most scholars preferred the designation The
Caliph of the Prophet of God [khalifat rasul Allah]. Hence, the
well-known jurist al-Mawardi (d. 450/1058) stated:
And, he is called Caliph because he succeeded the Prophet
[in leading] the Nation (ummah). So it is proper to call him
the Caliph of the Prophet (successor of the Prophet). The
scholars disagreed over whether it is proper to call him the
Caliph of God. Some allowed it because he (the leader) ful-
medieval Muslim jurists than contemporary fundamentalist publicists. See HASAN
HUDAYBI, DU'AH - LA QUDAH: ABHATH Fl AL-'AQIDAH AL-ISLAMYAH WA-MANHAJ AL-DA'WAH
ILA ALLAH (Dar al-Tiba'ah wa-al-Nashr al-Islamiyah 1977).
28. See ABU YA'LA MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HUSAYN IBN AL-FARRA' & WADI' ZAYDAN HAD-
DAD, KITAB AL-MU'TAMAD FI USUL AL-DIN (Dar al-mashriq 1974); GHAZZALI & 'ABD AL-
RAHMAN BADAWI, FADA'IH AL-BATINIYAH 135-37 (al-Dar al-Qawmiyah lil-Tiba'ah wa-al-
Nashr 1964) [hereinafter GHAZZALI, FADA'IH]; 'ALl IBN MUHAMMAD MAWARDI, ADAB AL-
DUNYA WA-AL-DIN 5 (Mustafd Saqqa ed., 1950) [hereinafter MAWARDI, ADAB].
29. ABU MUHAMMAB IBN QUTAYBA, AL IMAMA WA I SIYASA 21 (Mu'assasat al-Halabi
1967). This book is traditionally known as Ta'rikh al-Khulafa'.
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fills the rights of God in His people ... but the majority of the
jurists disallowed it. . . because succession can only be in the
rights of one who is dead or absent, and God is never absent
or dead.3°
Nevertheless, the Caliph's source of legitimacy and parame-
ters of his powers remained ambiguous. Whether the Caliph was
considered the Prophet's successor or God's deputy, from a the-
ological point of view, the Caliph did not enjoy the authority of
either the Prophet or God. Theologically speaking, God and His
Prophet cannot be equated with any other, and their powers of
legislation, revelation, absolution, and punishment cannot be
delegated to any other. Yet, the exact nature and extent of the
Caliph's powers remained contested. This is partly due to the
fact that the Divine law provides a nexus to the powers and au-
thority of both God and His Prophet. In principle, the applica-
tion of God's law implies giving effect to the Divine will, which,
in turn, implicates the authority of the Divine. Therefore, Ibn al-
Jawzi, for example, states: "The Caliph is God's deputy over
God's followers and lands, and [the Caliphate entails] applying
His orders and laws. [This function] was performed by His
Prophets and the Caliph performs that role after them (the
Prophets)."' Even if one assumes that the Caliph cannot be
considered the moral equivalent of God or the Prophet, the
question remains: how much of the Prophet's legislative and ex-
ecutive authority does the Caliph enjoy? According to the prom-
inentjurist Ibn Taymiyah (d. 728/1328), the word Caliph simply
means the physical or historical act of ruling after the Prophet,
but it does not connote the transference of the Prophet's au-
thority or power. The Caliph is the historical, not the moral,
successor of the Prophet; thus, the moral and legal authority of
the Prophet (or God) does not vest in a person carrying the title
of Caliph.32 At one point, Ibn Taymiyah stated:
He (the Caliph) is not the people's Lord so that he could
possibly do without [their assistance]; and he is not God's
Prophet, acting as their agent to God. But he and the people
are partners who [must] cooperate for the welfare [of the
30. 'ALI IBN MUHAMMAD MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYAH WA-AL-\WILAYAT AL-
DINIYAH 15 (Mustafd al-Babi al-Halabi 1966).
31. 1 AL-MISBAH, supra note 13, at 93.




people] in this earthly life and the Hereafter. They (the peo-
ple) must help him, and he must help them.33
Ibn Taymiyah's conception of the relationship between the ruler
and the ruled is egalitarian, but it does not help in understand-
ing the source of the Caliph's powers or in delineating the na-
ture of the relationship between the ruler and his people. Ide-
ally, the ruler and the ruled should cooperate in order to maxi-
mize the best interests of the community, but the question
remains: what is the exact nature of the Caliph's powers vis-d-vis
his subjects?
The jurist al-Baqillani (d. 403/1013) is more explicit in dif-
ferentiating between the authority of the Caliph, and God or the
Prophet. He argues the following:
The imam (leader) is chosen to apply the laws expounded by
the Prophet and recognized by the Nation, and he, in all that
he does, is the Nation's trustee and representative; and it (the
Nation) is behind him, correcting him and reminding him
... and removing him and replacing him when he does what
calls for his removal.3 4
In al-Baqillani's conception of the Caliphate, the ruler is the
people's duly delegated agent who is charged with the obligation
of implementing God's law. This brings us closer to the idea of a
representative government, and to a government of limited pow-
ers. Arguably, the limitations are imposed by the people who act
as overseers, insuring compliance with God's law. The impera-
tive of acting as overseers is performed pursuant to the religious
obligation to enjoin the good and forbid the evil [al-amr bi
ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar]. According to Islamic law, Mus-
lims are commanded to enjoin the good and forbid the evil,
which includes the obligation to prevent the government from
violating the Shari'ah.3 5 Significantly, according to the classical
33. Id. at 178.
34. MUHAMMAD IBN AL-TAYYIB BAQILLANI ET AL., AL-TAMHID FI AL-RADD 'ALA AL-
MULHIDAH AL-MU'ATrILAH WA-AL-RAFIDAH WA-AL-KHAWARIJ WA-AL-MU'TAZILAH 56 (Dar al-
Fikr al-'Arabi 1989) [hereinafter BAQILLANI]. See also YUSUF IBISH, THE POLITICAL DOC-
TRINE OF AL-BAQILLANI (1966) (discussing Baqillani's political thought).
35. See MICHAEL COOK, COMMANDING THE RIGHT AND FORBIDDING THE WRONG IN
ISLAMIC THOUGHT (2000) (describing the duty of enjoining the good and forbidding
the evil). See also EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 123, 180-82, 194-
96, 273-74, 304-06 (discussing the assertion of this duty against the government). Typi-
cally, Sunni jurists differentiated between the duty of enjoining the good and forbid-
ding the evil in matters involving the rights of God [huquq Allah] as opposed to matters
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theory, the Caliph's charge is not necessarily to give effect to the
will of the people, but to give effect to God's will, as exemplified
by God's law. 6 However, this brings us full circle, once again, to
the issue of the boundaries set by the Divine law and the extent
that Shari'ah law provides limits on the discretion and power of
the ruler. Aside from the issue of the exact limits placed upon
the ruler's powers, it is imperative that it be recognized that wed-
ding the notion of the Caliphate to the Divine law creates an
intimate connection between the Caliph and the Divine will and
that the Divine will is not as discernable as some would like to
believe.
Whether the Caliph is considered God's deputy or the
Prophet's deputy, the question is: to whom does the Caliph an-
swer? If the Caliph's primary obligation is to implement the Di-
vine law, then arguably, the Caliph answers only to God. Since
God's law is not always discernable, as long as the Caliph's ac-
tions are plausible interpretations of the mandates of God's law,
then such interpretations must be accepted. But the idea that
the Caliph's primary charge is to give effect to God's law, and
the associated idea that the Caliph answers only to God, creates a
symbolic privity or, at least, the appearance of a special relation-
ship between the Caliph and God. It is not so much that the
Caliph becomes the representative of the Divine will, but that
the Caliph comes to be perceived as having a symbolic associa-
tion or connection with God, as the guardian and protector of
God's will and law. Often, this is manifested simply in a pre-
sumption of deference to the Caliph. Al-Baqillani's discourse,
involving the rights of human beings [huquq al-'ibad or huquq al-adamiyyin]. Sunni ju-
rists also distinguished a third category of rights, which they called the mixed rights of
God and human beings [al-huquq al-mukhtalatah]. The rights of human beings were
further divided into private and public rights [al-huquq al-'ammah wa al-huquq al-khas-
sah]. Each category of rights necessitated different rules ofjurisdiction and methods of
enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. The emphasis was primarily juristic: the
classical jurists discussed which categories required the intervention of the police [al-
shurtah], the market inspector [muhtasib], or the judiciary. In this context, non-govern-
mental interveners or private activists were called al-mutatawwi'un [volunteers]. Espe-
cially as to the rights of people and private rights, although Sunni jurists did envision a
role to be played by private non-governmental individuals in enjoining the good and
forbidding the evil, for the most part, they were opposed to forcible self-help. See
IMAWARDI, AL-AHKAM, supra note 12, at 303-22; AL-FARRA', supra note 12, at 284-308. Nev-
ertheless, this is among the areas of Islamic thought that remains poorly studied in
modern scholarship, and therefore it is difficult to understand the full implications of
this juristic discourse.
36. IBISH, supra note 34, at 99.
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itself, reflects this symbolic connection when he discusses
whether a ruler may name a successor to the Caliphate. Al-Baqil-
lani argues that, in fact, it is permissible for the Caliph to do so,
and that the people should accept his nomination. His justifica-
tion is the most interesting part of his discussion; he argues that
the people should accept the Caliph's decision because there is a
legal presumption that the Caliph always acts in the best interest
of his people. According to al-Baqillani, for people to believe
otherwise is a sin that calls for repentance.3 7 This type of pre-
sumption is coherent only if the ruler both represents the Divine
will and answers to God. If the ruler discharges the duties of
piety by giving effect to God's law, however God's law is defined,
he has fulfilled his duties towards the people, and the quality or
genuineness of his intentions are assessed only by God. As a re-
sult of this type of paradigm, most Sunni jurists argued that a
ruler is not removable from power unless he commits a clear,
visible, and major infraction against God (i.e., a major sin).38
Muslim jurists, however, did not completely sever the con-
nection between the ruler and the people. In Sunni theory, the
Caliphate must be based on a contract ['aqd] between the Caliph
and ahl al-hall wa al-'aqd [the people who have the power of con-
tract, also known as ahl al-ikhtiyar or the people who choose]
who give their bay'a [allegiance or consent to the Caliph]. In the
classical theory, a person who fulfills certain conditions [mustawfi
al-shurut] must come to power through a contract entered into
with ahl al-'aqd pursuant to which the Caliph is to receive the
bay'a in return for his promise to discharge the terms of the con-
tract. The terms of the contract were not extensively discussed
in Islamic sources. Typically, jurists would write a list of terms
that included the obligation to apply God's law, the obligation to
protect Muslims and the territory of Islam, and in return, the
ruler was promised the people's support and obedience. There
is no precedent in Islamic discourses for a negotiated contract of
the Caliphate. The jurists seemed to treat the contract as a con-
tract of implied terms, but there is no explicit rejection of the
notion of a contract of negotiated terms. The extent to which
the contract of the Caliphate is subject to the principle of free-
dom of contract and permissibility of negotiation remains unex-
37. BAQILLANI, supra note 34, at 76.
38. See WArt, supra note 12, at 58. See also LAMBTON, supra note 12, at 19, 37.
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plored in Islamic thinking. Thus far, it has been assumed that
Shari'ah law defines the terms of the contract.
Who are the people that have the power to choose and re-
move the ruler? According to some, like the Mu'tazili39 scholar
Abu Bakr al-Asam (d. 200/816), it is the public at large that con-
stitutes this group. Therefore, according to this view, there must
be a general consensus over the ruler, and each person must
individually give his vote of allegiance to the ruler.40 The vast
majority of Muslim jurists disagreed with this position and
adopted a more pragmatic approach to power: they argued that
ahl al-'aqd are those who possess the necessary shawka [power or
strength] to insure the obedience, or, in the alternative, the con-
sent of the public. Although it does make a material difference
whether the people who possess this shawka represent the con-
sent of the governed, or whether they represent the ability to
yield a sufficient amount of power to insure the obedience of the
public, this issue remained unclear. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the ep-
onym of the conservative juristic school of thought, seems to pri-
marily speak of obedience: the people of shawka must be able to
deliver the obedience of the people to the ruler.41 On the other
hand, the jurist al-Ghazzali seems to focus on consent as the ma-
terial issue. He argues that shawka means the ability to deliver
the consent of the people; in other words, the consent of the ahl
al-'aqd must represent the consent of the governed.42 The idea
of the consent of the governed ought not to be equated, how-
ever, with conceptions of delegated powers or government by
39. The Mu'tazilah was a theological school of thought whose adherents called
themselves ahl al-'adl wa al-tawhid [the people of justice and unity]. The school traces
its origins to the thought of Wasil b. 'Ata' (d. 131/748) in Basra. The Mu'tazilah are
often described as rationalists for their emphasis on rational theology. They also con-
sidered justice and enjoining the good and forbidding the evil to be among the five
basic principles of faith. The Mu'tazilah's five principles of faith were: (1) tawhid [be-
lieving in the unity and singularity of God]; (2) 'adl [justice]; (3) al-wa'd wa al-wa'id [the
promise of reward and threat of punishment]; (4) al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn
[those who commit a major sin are neither believers nor non-believers]; (5) al-amr bi al-
ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar [commanding the good and prohibiting the evil].
40. Citing the precedent of the Prophet in Medina, al-Asam maintained that this
included free Muslim women, but not non-Muslims or slaves. Reportedly, upon migrat-
ing to Medina, the Prophet took the bay'a from a number of native women as well as
men. See MUHAMMAD 'IMARAH, AL-ISLAM WA FALSAFAT AL-HUKM 431-32 (n.p. 1979).
41. FATHI 'UTHMAN, MIN USUL AL-FIKR AL-SIYASI AL-ISLAMI: DIRASAH LI-HUQUQ AL-
INSAN WA-LI-WAD' RI'ASAT AL-DAWLAH (AL-IMAMAH) F! DAW' SHARI'AT AL-ISLAM WA-
TURATHIHI AL-TARIKHI WA-AL-FIQHI 402 (Mu'assasat al-Risala 1979).
42. GHAZZALI, FADA'IH, supra note 28, at 177.
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the people. The consent of which al-Ghazzali and others speak
does not seem to mean the existence of a representative govern-
ment that seeks to give effect to the will of the people. Rather,
consent in pre-modern Muslim discourses appears to be the
equivalent of acquiescence. Typically, Muslim jurists assert that
ahl al-'aqd must be people who fulfill certain conditions such as
decency, probity, knowledge, and wisdom. 43 Beyond these quali-
fications, the jurists assert that the group with the power to
choose must consist of a certain number of the notables of soci-
ety [shurafa' al-umma] or the prominent jurists.44 There is con-
siderable disagreement about how many individuals would be
sufficient to form such a group. Some, such as the jurist al-
Juwayni, argued that the exact number is immaterial; the group
that chooses the Caliph could be a single person or a hundred as
long as the consent of this group represents the consent of the
majority of the people.45
It is important to note that pre-modern Muslim scholars ex-
hibited a certain amount of distrust towards the laity [al-'amma].
For example, the Mu'tazili scholar al-Jahiz (d. 255/868-869),
describing the laity, wrote: "[t]hey (the laity) tend to float with
every ebb and flow, and maybe [the laity] will be more content
with choosing [to the Caliphate] the wrong-doers instead of the
righteous [rulers] .... 46 This type of attitude was widespread
among Muslim jurists, and considering the historical period in
which they wrote, it is not surprising. But this also meant that
although many of the concepts employed in political discourses
came close to affirming the idea of government through repre-
sentation, they never in fact did so. It is as if Muslim jurists gen-
erated legal concepts that were derived from the historical prac-
tices of the early Muslims, but never developed these concepts,
43. MAWARDI, ADAB, supra note 28, at 6; 'ABD AL-MALIK IBN 'ABD ALLAH IMAM AL-
HARAIMAYN AL-JUWAYNI ET AL., GHIYATH AL-UMAM Fl ILTIYATH AL-zULAM 50-51 (Dar al-
Da'wah 1979) [hereinafter AL-JUwAYNi].
44. See AL-JUWAYNI, supra note 43, at 49, 50-51; see also MAWARDI, ADAB, supra note
28, at 6-7; BAQILLANI supra note 34, at 49; 'UTHMAN, supra note 41, at 407-09; GHAZZALI,
supra note 28, at 177; KHAN, supra note 32, at 178; IBN AL-FARRA', supra note 12, at 19.
Some jurists added that under all circumstances, the Caliph cannot be the one to ap-
point ahl al-'aqd. See ABu YA'LA MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HusAYN IBN AL-FARRA', KITAB AL-
MU'TAMAD Fl USUL AL-DIN 245 (al-Hoda Publishers 1845).
45. See AL-JUWAYNI, supra note 43, at 55-57. See also BAQILLANI supra note 34, at 48-
49; 'IMAPIAH, supra note 40, at 439; 'ABD AL-QAHIR IBN TAHIR AL-BAGHDADI, KITAB USUL
AL-DIN 132-33 (n.d.).
46. IMARAH, supra note 40, at 435.
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and utilized them towards a theory of representation. For exam-
ple, Muslim jurists struggled with the conceptual nature of the
contract of the Caliphate. Various Muslim jurists maintained
that this political contract is akin to an employment contract,
sale contract, or marriage contract in trying to figure out the
jurisprudence that should apply to this unique form of contrac-
tual relationship.47 The political contract had rather clear his-
torical origins - it was initiated and practiced by the Compan-
ions after the death of the Prophet. The Prophet, himself, was
keen on taking the bay'a of his followers on several occasions.
Even more, when the Prophet became the ruler of Medina, he
drafted what is now known as the Constitution of Medina
[wathiqat al-Madina] .48
The Constitution of Medina does not read like a modern
constitutional document - rather, it reads more like a contract
or a corporate organizational document. These historical prece-
dents must have persisted into the practices of the early Muslim
community. Thus, although the historical origin was clear, the
theoretical justifications for the doctrines of a political contract,
consent, and the pledge of allegiance remained ambiguous. Sig-
nificantly, as the jurists formed a socially and professionally rec-
ognizable class of experts, they reasoned that the purpose of the
contract is to uphold God's law. The notion of political repre-
sentation, however, remained undeveloped, at best. The over-
whelming majority of Muslim jurists do not contend that the
purpose of the Caliphate's contract is to represent the will of the
governed. Instead, these jurists thought of the contract as essen-
tially a promise to uphold God's law. The consent of the people
is needed because the contract is premised on a cooperative rela-
47. See e.g., AL-BAGHDADI, supra note 45, at 132-33; LAMBTON, supra note 12, at 18.
48. For a discussion on the Constitution of Medina, see Anver M. Emon, Reflections
on the 'Constitution of Medina': An Essay on Methodology and Ideology in Islamic Legal History,
1 UCLAJ. ISLAMIC AND NEAR E.L. 103, 103-33 (2001); Frederick Denny, Ummah in the
Constitution of Medina, 36J. NEAR E. STUD. 39-47 (1977); Moshe Gil, The Constitution of
Medina: A Reconsideration, 4 ISR. ORIENTAL STUD. 44, 44-65 (1974); Akira Goto, The Con-
stitution of Medina, 18 ORIENT: REP. SOC'Y FOR NEAR E. STUD. JAPAN 1, 1-17 (1982);
HUSAYN MU'NIs, DUSTUR UMMAT AL-ISLAM: DIRASAH FI USUL AL-HUKM WA TABI'ATIHI WA-
GHAYATIHI 'INDA AL-MUSLIMIN (Dar al-Rashad 1993); Uri Rubin, The 'Constitution of Me-
dina'.- Some Notes, 62 STUDIA ISLAMICA 5, 5-23 (1986); R.B. Serjeant, The 'Constitution of
Medina', 8 THE ISLAMIC Q. 3, 3-16 (1964); The "SunnahJami'ah," Pacts with the Yathrib
Jews, and the "Tahrim" of Yathrib: Analysis and Translation of the Documents Com-
prised in the So-Called 'Constitution of Medina', 41 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL AND AFR.
STUD. 1, 1-42 (1978); 'WATT, supra note 12, at 130-34.
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tionship between the governor and governed, with the purpose
of guarding and protecting the righteous religion and Shari'ah.
Even though, as we will see below, there are glimpses of the no-
tion of representation on behalf of the people, the dominant
paradigm is one in which both the ruler and ruled act as God's
duly delegated agents [khulafa' Allah] in implementing the Di-
vine law.
Particularly after the age of mihna (inquisition - 218-234/
833-848) the 'ulama [religious scholars or jurists] were able to
establish themselves as the exclusive interpreters and articulators
of the Divine law. Towards the end of the reign of the 'Abbasid
Caliph al-Ma'mun (r. 198-218/813-833), the Caliph adopted the
Mu'tazili doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an, and insti-
tuted an inquisition against those jurists who refused to adhere
to this doctrine. Although ostensibly about a theological dispute
concerning whether the Qur'an was created or eternal (uncre-
ated), in reality, the inquisition was a concerted effort by the
State to control the juristic class and the method by which
Shari'ah law was generated. Ultimately, however, the inquisition
failed and, at least until the modern age, the jurists retained a
near exclusive monopoly over the right to interpret the Divine
law.49 Thus, in order for a Caliph and community to attain and
continue enjoying Islamic legitimacy, they would have to dedi-
cate themselves to upholding the will of God as articulated by
the jurists. In a sense, we end up with a tri-polar dynamic with
the ruler and governors at one pole, the jurists at another, and
the lay public at the third. But one would have to consider the
possibility that between the interpretive and legislative tasks of
the jurists and the executory duties of the ruler, the common
people do not play a major role in the negotiative process be-
tween the three social poles. This possibility is quite clear in the
statement made by the jurist Ibn al-Qayyim:
Properly speaking, the rulers (al-umara) are obeyed [only to
the extent] that their commands are consistent with the [de-
terminations] of the religious sciences (al-'ilm). Hence, the
duty to obey them (the rulers) derives from the duty to obey
the jurists (fa ta'atuhum tab'an 1i ta'at al-'ulama). [This is be-
cause] obedience is due only in what is good (ma'ru]), and
49. REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 90-96; A.J. Wensinck, Mihna, in
SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 377-78 (H.A.R. Gibb &J.H. Kramers eds., 1961).
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what is required by the religious sciences (wa ma awjabahu al-
'ilm). Since the duty to obey the jurists is derived from the
duty to obey the Prophet, then the duty to obey the rulers is
derived from the duty to obey the jurists [who are the experts
on the religious sciences]. Furthermore, since Islam is pro-
tected and upheld by the rulers and the jurists alike, this
means that the laity must follow [and obey] these two [,i.e.,
the rulers and jurists] 50
This type of statement generates the impression that the Is-
lamic system of government is a theocracy or, at least, a legalistic
technocracy, and in fact, inspired by passages such as this, mod-
ern fundamentalist groups do treat it as such. But understood
within their proper historical contexts, statements such as the
one quoted above would be read more as an aspirational moral
exhortation than a constitutional delineation of the authority of
the jurists. The absence of a singular authority conclusively and
authoritatively defining the Divine law and the remarkable diver-
sity of opinions and approaches within Islamic legal practices
have formed a barrier against the formation of a central church
that could rule in God's name. In addition, no church could
provide a jurist with the insignia of investiture and render him
authoritative regardless of his relationship to the laity. There
were seminaries that trained Muslim jurists, but the amount of
influence and authoritativeness that a jurist would enjoy de-
pended on his ability to convince various strata within society of
his sincerety, knowledge, and integrity. In the pre-modern age,
the epistemology of Islamic jurisprudence and the processes that
formed the juristic class contained popularistic elements. In
fact, the idea of government bound by law was the symbolic field
where Muslim jurists, armed with the Divine sanctity of Shari'ah
law, were able to play the role of the representatives and the
mediators on behalf of the government and the governed. In
order to better understand this process, it is necessary to disen-
tangle several layers of meaning in the debates surrounding the
concept of a government bound by Shari'ah.
50. 1 MUHAMMAD IBN ABi BAKR IBN QAYIM AL-JAWZIYAH, I'LAM AL-MUWAQQI'IN 'AN
RABB AL-'ALAMIN 10 (Dar al-Hadith 1997).
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IV. A GOVERNMENT BOUND BY LAW OR A
GOVERNMENT OF LAWS
As noted above, pre-modern and modern scholars often re-
peat that the quintessential characteristic of a legitimate Islamic
government is that it is a government subject to and limited by
Shari'ah law. Although this concept does tend to offer support
for the principles of limited government and the rule of law, we
must distinguish between the idea of the supremacy of law, and
the supremacy of legal rules. The two are quite distinct, and
each concept has the potential of producing very different orien-
tations towards the relationship between law and power. In as-
serting the supremacy of Shari'ah, Muslim scholars were not ar-
guing that there ought to be a process that guards core legal
values and that this process is binding upon the government.
Rather, they were arguing that the positive commandments of
Shari'ah, such as the punishment for adultery or the drinking of
alcohol, ought to be honored and implemented by the govern-
ment. The problem, however, is that it is possible for a govern-
ment to declare its intention to abide by all the positive com-
mandments of Shari'ah, but otherwise manipulate the interpre-
tation and application of the rules in order to obtain desired
results. As is the practice of several contemporary Islamist States,
nothing prevents the government from implementing a process
that rubberstamps whatever the government deems desirable.
Unless there are institutional mechanisms and procedural guar-
antees safeguarding the implementation of law, the fact that a
government is committed to implementing a particular set of
rulings does not amount to the supremacy of law, or the estab-
lishment of the rule of law.
The problem in this regard is that the juristic conception of
a government limited by Shari'ah amounted to a notion that the
government is acting lawfully if it is implementing the legal rul-
ings of Shari'ah. Nevertheless, a government could implement
Shari'ah criminal penalties, prohibit usury, dictate rules of mod-
esty, and so on, and yet remain a government of unlimited pow-
ers not subject to the rule of law. This is because Shari'ah is a
general term for a multitude of legal methodologies and a re-
markably diverse set of interpretive determinations.5 1 Unless the
51. Structurally, Shari'ah is comprised of the Qur'an, Sunnah, and fiqh Uuristic
interpretive efforts]. Substantively, the Shari'ah refers to three different matters: (1)
[Vol. 27:4
ISLAM AND DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENT
conception of government is founded around core moral values
about the normative purpose of Shari'ah, and unless there is a
process that limits the ability of the government to violate those
core moral values, the idea of a government bound by Shari'ah
remains hopelessly vague. It is quite possible for a government
to faithfully implement the main technical rules of Shari'ah, but
otherwise flout the rule of law. In fact, using the implementa-
tion of the technicalities of Shari'ah as an excuse could allow the
government unrestrained powers. For instance, under the pre-
tense of guarding public modesty, the government could pass
arbitrary laws forbidding many forms of public assembly; under
the guise of protection of orthodoxy, the government could pass
arbitrary laws punishing creative expression; under the guise of
protecting individuals from slander, the government could pun-
ish many forms of political and social criticism; and a govern-
ment could imprison or execute political dissenters, while claim-
ing that the dissenters are sowing fitnah [discord and social tur-
moil].
Arguably, all these governmental actions are Shari'ah-com-
pliant unless there is a clear sense about the limits imposed
upon the ability of the government to service and promote even
the Shari'ah. Put differently, the rules of law cannot be used as
an excuse to flout the rule of law, and the State cannot be al-
lowed to usurp the process by which Shari'ah law is identified or
determined. The rule of law does not simply mean the existence
of a government bound by law as much as it means a govern-
ment that is bound by the process that produces the law. More
importantly, it means that the processes of law, themselves, are
bound by fundamental and unwavering moral commitments that
insure that the law is not used as an instrument of tyranny and
oppression.
In pre-modern juristic literature, the issue of limits to be
placed on the law-making power of the State was discussed, in
part, under the rubric of public interest [al-masalih al-mursalah]
and blocking the means to illegality [sadd al-dhari'ah]. Both ju-
general principles of law and morality; (2) methodologies for extracting and formulat-
ing the law; and (3) the ahkam, which are the specific positive rules of law. In the
contemporary Muslim world, there is a tendency to focus on the ahkam at the expense
of the general principles and methodology. It is entirely possible to be Shai'ah-compli-
ant, in the sense of respecting the ahkam, but ignore or violate the principles and meth-
odologies of Shari'ah.
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risprudential concepts, although technically different, enabled
the State to extend its law-making powers in order to fulfill a
good or avoid an evil. For instance, pursuant to the principle of
blocking the means, the lawmaker could claim that behavior that
is lawful ought to be considered unlawful because it leads to the
commission of illegal acts. In essence, both public interests and
blocking the means were enabling devices that provided the law
with considerable flexibility and adaptive ability. However, they
were also double-edged concepts. They could be employed to
respond to social demands, but they could also be used to ex-
pand the law and augment its intrusiveness at the expense of
individual autonomy. Muslim jurists disagreed sharply on the
permissibility and scope of these legal methodologies because a
considerable number of jurists worried that these concepts were
limitless and that they could be utilized to create a wide range of
temporal non-Shari'ah based law. 52  The concept of blocking
the means to evil, in particular, is founded on the idea of preven-
tive or precautionary measures [al-ihtiyat], and it is this aggres-
sive reactionary nature that could be exploited to expand the
power of the State under the guise of protecting the Shari'ah.
For instance, the claim of precautionary measures has been used
in Saudi Arabia to justify a wide range of restrictive laws against
women, including the prohibition against driving cars.5" In
many instances, this amounted to the use of Shari'ah to under-
mine Shari'ah. This type of dynamic can be avoided not only
through the adoption of procedural guarantees, but more im-
portantly, through basic commitments to the dignity and free-
doms of human beings, which the Shari'ah can be utilized to
justify, but cannot be allowed to undermine.
An important dimension to the challenge of establishing
the rule of law is the complex, and often ambiguous, relation-
ship between Shari'ah law and what may be called the adminis-
trative practices of the State, or expediency laws [al-ahkam al-
siyasiyyah]. As noted earlier, by the 4th/10th century, Muslim
jurists had established themselves as the legitimate and exclusive
authority empowered to expound the law of God. Only the ju-
rists were deemed to possess the requisite level of technical com-
52. See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 267-81,
310-20 (rev. ed., Islamic Text Soc'y 1991).
53. See SPEAKING IN GOD'S NAME, supra note 20, at 22-23, 235, 278-80 (discussing
the prohibition against women driving automobiles).
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petence and learning that would qualify them to investigate and
interpret the Divine will. While in the first two centuries of Is-
lam, it was possible to find jurists citing the practices of the State
as a normative precedent, this became increasingly rare.54 This
did not mean that the practice of the State was considered illegit-
imate or without justification. Rather, it meant only that the de-
terminations of the jurists were considered to be of prescriptive
value. Additionally, it meant that the State was expected to play
the role of enforcer, not the maker, of Divine laws. Only the
juristic law could enjoy the seal of divinity. State laws, on the
other hand, were considered temporal, and therefore, primarily
the product of functional necessities rather than an interpreta-
tion of the Divine will. However, pursuant to the powers derived
from its role as the enforcer of Divine laws, the State was granted
a broad range of discretion over what were considered matters
of public interest [known as the field of al-siyasah al-Shar'iyyah].
The State's rule-making activity in the exercise of this discretion
was considered to be akin to regulatory administrative rules that
have temporal weight, but that are not a part of binding prece-
dents of Shari'ah law. State regulations were lawful and enforce-
able as long as they did not contravene the Divine law, as ex-
pounded by the jurists, and as long as they did not constitute an
abusive use of discretion [al-ta'assuffi masa'l al-khiyar]. This is
the reason that jurisprudential works meticulously documented
the determinations ofjurists, but did not document State regula-
tions. State regulations were documented in texts written by
state functionaries composing works on the administrative prac-
tices of the State.
The differentiation between temporal, or perhaps secular,
State regulations and juristic Shari'ah law in Islamic history is
subtle and often quite complex. It also raises serious questions
about the Muslim conceptions of State power and ideas of sover-
eignty. But it has not been sufficiently explored in modern
scholarship, and therefore, it is difficult to draw any firm conclu-
sions from the little that we do know about these classical dis-
courses.55 Nevertheless, it is rather clear that the classical jurists
did not consider Shari'ah as existing in conflict or even in ten-
54. See REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 90-99.
55. Examining this issue, some scholars reached the premature conclusion that
Shari'ah law was primarily theoretical and unenforceable throughout Islamic history.
They argued that the State relied on administrative regulations and, for the most part,
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sion with administrative law. What was described as al-ahkam al-
Sultaniyyah or al-siyasah al-shar'iyyah was expected to guard and
help fulfill the aims of Shari'ah. The administrative regulations
of the State were considered a function of public policy or polit-
ics, but in the dictum of Muslim jurists, Shari'ah is considered
the foundation of law, and politics is its protector.56 Shari'ah
was expected to play the dual role of enabling and limiting the
regulatory powers of the State. In theory, the Shari'ah lends le-
gitimacy to the regulatory powers of the State, but, in turn, such
regulations are not supposed to contravene the Shari'ah. This
paradigm, however, ended full circle with the core problem of
clearly delineating the limits to the government's assertion of
State power. To what extent can the government extend the
reach of its laws under the guise of guarding or properly fulfil-
ling the purposes of Shari'ah?
Concerns about the reach of the government's power under
Shari'ah have antecedents in Islamic history, and so, by the stan-
dards of the modern age, this is not an entirely novel issue. The
Maliki jurist al-Qarafi (d. 684/1285) attempted to articulate a
theory defining the legal jurisdiction of Caliphs, judges, and
juris-consuls. 7 There is also historic anecdotal evidence expres-
sing concern about the ability of contending parties to manipu-
late the interpretation of the Shari'ah to achieve certain aims.
For instance, a report was attributed to the Prophet in which he
reportedly says, "If you lay siege to a fortress, do not accept the
surrender of the fortress on the condition that you will apply
God's law, for you do not know [what] God's law requires.
Rather, have them surrender on the condition that you will ap-
ignored Shari'ah law. See, e.g., NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 120-34
(1964); JOSEPH SCHACT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAuIC LAW 49-56 (1964).
56. See, e.g., MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM, supra note 12, at 18; TAQI AL-DIN IBN TAYMnIWAH,
AL-SIYASAH AL-SHAR'YvAH 142 (Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah 1983). Similarly, Muslim jurists
often would assert that religion is the foundation and the political authorities are its
protector.
57. See SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURIS-
PRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI (1996); From Prophetic Action to Constitutional The-
ory: A Novel Chapter in Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence, 25 INT'LJ. MIDDLE E. STUD. 71, 71-
90 (1993). In addition, there is considerable juristic discourse on the proper jurisdic-
tion of the police and market inspectors as opposed to judges. In summary, the police
and market inspectors have no jurisdiction over any issue that involves competing fac-
tual or legal contentions. These issues must be referred to the judge. See 'ABD AL-
RAHMAN B. NASR AL-SHAYZARI, THE BOOK OF THE ISLAMIC MARKET INSPECTOR 28 n.1 (R.P.
Buckley trans., 1999); MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM, supra note 12, at 100.
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ply your own judgment. 15 ' Reports such as this, reflect a nascent
concern with the nature of the constraints that the broad con-
cept of Shari'ah may have on the actual process of adjudication
or resolution of disputes. However, the invocation of Shari'ah
or the Qur'an and Sunnah in confrontation with authority was
often used as a symbolic point referring to legitimacy or legality
in the management of the social order. For example, in another
anecdotal report that reflects this dynamic, the first Umayyad Ca-
liph Mu'awiya (r. 40-60/661-680) asked Hujr b. 'Adi al-Kindi (d.
51/671) for his allegiance [bay'a]. AI-Kindi reportedly agreed to
give his allegiance but only on the condition that Mu'awiya abide
by the Qur'an and Sunnah. Mu'awiya refused, arguing that a
conditional allegiance is ineffective and, hence, al-Kindi refused
to give his oath of allegiance.59
The difficulty, however, is that these types of concerns that
led to the differentiation between the Divine law of the jurists
and the temporal laws of the State are nearly entirely absent
from the framework of contemporary Islamists. To date, Islamist
models, whether in Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Pakistan, have en-
dowed the State with legislative power over the Divine law. This
is a relatively novel invention in Islamic State practices. Tradi-
tionally, Muslim jurists insisted that the rulers ought to consult
with the jurists on all matters related to law, but the jurists, them-
selves, never demanded the right to rule the Islamic State di-
rectly. In fact, until recently, neither Sunni nor Shi'ijurists ever
assumed direct rule in the political sphere.6" Throughout Is-
lamic history, the jurists ['ulama] performed a wide range of eco-
nomic, political, and administrative functions, but most impor-
tantly, they acted as negotiative mediators between the ruling
classes and the laity. As Afaf Marsot states: "[The 'ulama] were
58. MUHAMMAD IBN AHMAD DHAHABI, SIVAR A'LAM AL-NUBALA' 19, 190 (4th ed.,
Mu'assasat al-Risalah 1986).
59. See 'ALI IBN AHMAD IBN HAZM, JAMHARAT ANSAB AL-'ARAB 401 (Evariste Levi-
Provencal ed., Dari al-Ma'arif 1948); see also 5 ABu JA'FAR MUHAMMAD IBN JARIR AL-
TABARI, TARIKH AL-TABARI: (TARIKH AL-UMAM WA-AL-MULUK) 141-42 (Mu'assasat 'Izz al-
Din 1987); 3 'Izz AL-DIN IBN AL-ATHIR, AL-KAMIL F AL-TARIKH 336 (Abu al-Fida' 'Abd
Allah al-Qadi ed., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah 1986).
60. After the evacuation of the French in Egypt in 1801, 'Umar Makram, with the
assistance of the jurists, overthrew the French agent left behind. Instead of assuming
power directly, the jurists offered the government to the Egyptianized Albanian
Muhamma 'Ali. See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, The Ulanza of Cairo in the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, in SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND SURS 149-65, 162-63 (Nikki Keddi ed.,
1972).
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the purveyors of Islam, the guardians of its tradition, the deposi-
tory of ancestral wisdom, and the moral tutors of the popula-
tion."61 While they legitimated and often explained the rulers to
the ruled, the jurists also used their moral weight to thwart tyran-
nous measures, and, at times, led or legitimated rebellions
against the ruling classes.6 2 As Marsot points out, "[t]o both rul-
ers and ruled they were an objective haven which contending
factions could turn to in times of stress."63 Modernity, however,
through a complex dynamic, turned the 'ulama from "vociferous
spokesmen of the masses" into salaried State functionaries that
play a primarily conservative and legitimist role for the ruling
regimes in the Islamic world.64 The disintegration of the role of
the 'ulama and their co-optation by the modern praetorian State,
with its hybrid practices of secularism, has opened the door for
the State to become the maker and enforcer of the Divine law.
In doing so, the State has acquired a formidable power that only
serves to further engrain the practice of authoritarianism in vari-
ous Islamic States.65
V. THE 1DEAL OF A CONSULTATIVE GOVERNMENT
The Qur'an instructs the Prophet to consult regularly with
Muslims on all significant matters, and it also indicates that a
society that conducts its affairs through some form of delibera-
tive process is considered praiseworthy in the eyes of God."6
61. Id. at 149.
62. Id. at 150. For an exhausted study on the role of the 'ulama' in the legitimat-
ing rulers and rebellions through the use of their moral weight, see REBELLION AND
VIOLENCE, supra note 12. On the social and political roles played by the 'ulama,' see
EDWARD MORTIMER, FAITH AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF ISLAM 299-307 (1982); MAL-
COLM H. KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM: THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORIES OF MUHAMMAD
'ABDUH AND RASHID RIDA 196 (1966); LouisJ. Cantori, Religion and Politics in Egypt, in
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 77-90 (Michael Curtis ed., 1981).
63. Marsot, supra note 60, at 159.
64. Daniel Crecelius, Nonideological Responses of the Egptian Ulama to Modernization,
in SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND SUFIS, supra note 60, at 167-209, 168. Crecelius makes this
point about the 'ulama' of Egypt in the modern age. But see Fouad Ajami, In the
Pharoah s Shadow: Religion and Authority in Egypt, in ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 18
Uames Piscatory ed., 1983); MORTIMER, supra note 62, at 91, 95. MALISE RUTHVEN, IS-
LAM IN THE WORLD 179 (1984). Of course, there are notable exceptions in the contem-
porary Islamic practice. Many clerics become prominent opponents of the present
Muslim regimes, and suffer enormously for their troubles.
65. For a discussion of the idea of the praetorian state, see AMos PERLMUTrER,
EGYPT: THE PRAETORIAN STATE (1974).
66. See QUR'AN 3:159; 42:38.
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There are many historical reports indicating that the Prophet
regularly consulted with his Companions regarding the affairs of
the State.6 7 In addition, shortly after the death of the Prophet,
the concept of shura [consultative deliberations] had become a
symbol signifying participatory politics and legitimacy. There
are a variety of early Islamic historical narratives that indicate
that the Qur'anic discourse on a consultative and deliberative
socio-political order had captured the imagination of early Mus-
lims. The failure to enforce or adhere to shura became a com-
mon theme invoked in narratives of oppression and rebellion.
For example, it is reported that the Prophet's cousin 'Ali
reproached Umar b. al-Khattab, the second Caliph, and Abu
Bakr, the first Caliph, for not respecting the shura by nominating
Abu Bakr to the Caliphate in the absence of the Prophet's fam-
ily.68 The opposition to 'Uthman b. 'Affan (r. 23-35/644-656),
the third Rightly Guided Caliph, accused him of destroying the
rule of shura because of his alleged nepotistic and autocratic pol-
icies. The pretender to the Caliphate, Ibn al-Zubayr (r. 60-73/
680-692), justified his rebellion by accusing the Umayyads of de-
stroying the shura, and undermining the rights of the people
[huquq al-nas]. Al-Hasan, 'Ali's son and the Prophet's grandson,
lamented that the Caliphate was passed on from Mu'awiya, the
first Umayyad Caliph, r. 40-60/661-680, to his son Yazid by say-
ing: "If it had not been for that fact, the Caliphate would have
been continued by shura until the Final Day. 6 9
A prominent medieval scholar like al-Jahiz contended that
Mu'awiya was able to achieve power only by destroying the shura
and ruling by force and oppression.7 ' Although the precise
meaning of shura in these historical narratives is unclear, most
certainly the concept did not refer to the mere act of a ruler
soliciting the opinions of some notables in society. The term
seemed to signify the opposite of autocracy, government by
force, or oppression. This is consistent with the juristic attitude
67. 'ABD AL-WXAHHAB KHALLAF, 'ILM USUL AL-FIQH 59 (Dar al-Qalam 1981).
68. LI-JALAL AL-DIN 'ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-SuJYUTI, TARIKH AL-KHULAFA' 109 (Muham-
mad Abu Ibrahim al-Fadl ed., Dar Nahdat Misr. 1976).
69. Id. at 325.
70. 'IMARAH, supra note 40, at 651; ABu 'UTHMAN IBN BAHR AL-JAHIZ, RASA'IL AL-
JAHIZ AL-RASA'IL AL-SIYASIYAH 396-97 (Dar wa-maktabat al-Hilal 1987). See DJAIT, supra
note 24, at 114, 210-13 (discussing the role of the concept of shura in early Islamic
politics).
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towards despotism [al-istibdad] and whimsical and autocratic gov-
ernance [al-hukm bi' hawa wa al-tasallut], realities which they
considered repulsive and evil. Even when Muslim jurists prohib-
ited rebellions against despotic rulers, they tolerated despotism
not as a desirable good, but as a necessary evil.
Post 3rd/9th century, the concept of shura took an institu-
tional shape in the discourses of Muslim jurists. Shura became
the formal act of consulting ahl al-shura [the people of consulta-
tion], who, according to the juristic sources, are the same group
of people who constitute ahl al-'aqd [the people who choose the
ruler]. Sunni jurists debated whether the results of the consulta-
tive process are binding [shura mulzima] or non-binding [ghayr
mulzima]. If the shura is binding, then the ruler must abide by
the determinations made by ahl al-shura. The majority of the
jurists, however, concluded that the determinations of ahl al-
shura are advisory, not compulsory. But, rather inconsistently,
many jurists asserted that, after consultation, the ruler must fol-
low the opinion that is most consistent with the Qur'an, Sunnah,
and the consensus of jurists. In effect, while these jurists were
not willing to argue that the ruler ought to be free to ignore the
opinions that are the most consistent with the Qur'an, Sunnah,
and consensus of the jurists, they did not go as far as advocating
a mandatory duty upon the ruler to follow such opinions. Inter-
estingly, some jurists, such as Ibn Taymiyah, maintained that the
ruler should attempt to ascertain the general consensus of Mus-
lims, and not simply the consensus of jurists, and follow it.7 1
Most jurists, however, left the matter open-ended by limiting
themselves to the argument that even if the Caliph is knowledge-
able in law, he should not rule on any problem that involves
Shari'ah without first consulting the jurists.7 2 As al-Ghazzali as-
serted in this context: "Despotic, non-consultative, decision-
making, even if from a wise and learned person is objectionable
and unacceptable."73
Modern reformists have seized upon the ideal of a consulta-
71. IBN TAYMIXYAH, supra note 56, at 136.
72. GHAZZALI, supra note 28, at 191, 193; SHARAF & MUHAMMAD, supra note 12, at
399-403. See also AL-SHIFA', supra note 13, at 55 (discussing the consulting ofjurists); AL-
FARRA', supra note 28, at 221; SHARAF & MUHAMMAD, supra note 12, at 351 (discussing
the thought of the Seljuq wazir, Nizam al-Mulk (d. 485/1092)).
73. GHAZZALI, FADA'IH, supra note 28, at 186, 191; SHARAF & MUHAMMAD, supra
note 12, at 399-403.
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tive government as a way of arguing for the basic compatibility
between Islam and democracy. There is no doubt that the im-
perative of shura is an important participatory ethic in the Is-
lamic intellectual heritage. This is so, irrespective of how this
ethic was used or misused in Islamic history because as a norma-
tive ideal, it could be co-opted and utilized in the furtherance of
a democratic commitment. But even if the ethic of shura is ex-
panded into a broader concept of a participatory government,
no less important than the process are the moral commitments
that inform the process. If the purpose of consultation is to find
a correct answer that is derived from the Divine will, one might
end up with the awkward situation where divinity is not repre-
sented by a single ruler, but by a consultative or legislative body.
Instead of a ruling autocrat being capable of speaking on God's
behalf, the authority is transferred to a council-like body that is
empowered with the voice of God. This is problematic because
such a body can be used to inflict a tyranny of the majority
against a discrete minority, suppress dissent, and limit diversity.
This is why even if shura is transformed into an instrumentality
of participatory representation this instrumentality must itself be
limited by a scheme of private and individual rights that serve an
overriding moral goal such asjustice. In other words, shura must
be valued not because of the results it produces, but because it
represents a moral value in itself. As a result, regardless of the
utility or disutility caused by the existence of dissenting views,
dissent would be tolerated because doing so is seen as a basic
part of the mandate of justice.
VI. JUSTICE AND THE ISLAMIC POLITY
Muslim political thought dealt extensively with the purpose
of government. The statement of Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni
(d. 478/1085) is fairly representative of the argument of Muslim
jurists. AI-Juwayni states:
The imama (government) is a total governorship and general
leadership that relates to the special and common in the af-
fairs of religion and this earthly life. It includes guarding the
land and protecting the subjects, and the spread of the mes-
sage [of Islam] by the word and sword. It includes the cor-
recting of deviation and the redressing of injustice, the aiding
of the wronged against the wrongdoer, and taking the right
from the obstinate and giving it to those who are entitled to
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The essential idea conveyed here is that government is a func-
tional necessity in order to resolve conflict, protect the religion,
and uphold justice. In some formulations, justice is the core
value that justifies the existence of government. Ibn al-Qayyim
(d. 751/1350), for example, makes this point explicit when he
asserts the following:
God sent His message and His Books to lead people with jus-
tice . . . . Therefore, if a just leadership is established,
through any means, then therein is the Way of God .... In
fact, the purpose of God's Way is the establishment of right-
eousness and justice .. .so any road that establishes what is
right and just is the road [Muslims] should follow. 75
This argument is rooted in a methodical debate among pre-mod-
ern scholars about the nature of people if left without a govern-
ment. This debate is remarkably similar to the seventeenth cen-
tury Western discourse on the state of nature or the original con-
dition of human beings. The Islamic debate focused on the
original, so to speak uncorrupted, nature of human beings and
how that nature affects the role and purpose of government.
Some scholars such as Ibn Khaldun (d. 784/1382) and al-Ghaz-
zali (d. 505/1111) argued that human beings are by nature frac-
tious, contentious, and not inclined towards cooperation. Al-
Ghazzali, in particular, added that human beings are prone to
misunderstandings and conflicts. If one observes the affairs of
people, one will notice that married couples and even parents
and children fight and refuse to cooperate in mutually beneficial
endeavors. Therefore, these authorities typically argued, govern-
ment is necessary to force people to cooperate with each other.
Government, in a paternalistic fashion, must force people to act
contrary to their fractious and contentious natures, and in every-
one's general best interest. 76
Another school of thought exemplified by al-Mawardi (d.
450/1058) and Ibn Abi al-Rabi' (d. 656/1258) argued that peo-
ple, by their nature, have a tendency to cooperate for physical
74. AL-JUwAYNI, supra note 43, at 15.
75. 4 IBN QAYIM AL-JAWZIYAH & MUHAMMAD IBN ABi BAKR, I'LAM AL-MUWAQQI'IN 'AN
RABB AL-'ALAMIN 452 ('Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil ed., Dar al'kutub al-haditha 1969).
76. BARAKAT, supra note 10, at 116; SHARAF & MUHAMMAD, supra note 12, at 377,
380-81, 514-15; GHAZZALI, AL-IQTISAD Fl AL-I'TIQAO 106 (1971).
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and spiritual reasons. In fact, God created human beings weak
and in need of cooperation with others in order to limit the abil-
ity of human beings to commit injustice. Although this school of
thought did not elaborate upon the meaning of justice, its ad-
herents asserted that without cooperation, human beings will
not be able to overcome injustice [zulm], or establish justice
['adl]. Without social cooperation, the strong are bound to vio-
late the rights [huquq] of the weak, and injustice will become
widespread. By cooperating with each other, human beings will
be able to restrain the strong, and safeguard the rights of the
weak. Furthermore, God created human beings diverse and dif-
ferent from each other so that they will need each other. This
need will invite human beings to further augment their natural
tendency to assemble and cooperate in order to establish justice.
The relative weakness of human beings and their remarkably di-
verse abilities and habits will further induce people to draw
closer and cooperate with each other. Importantly, human be-
ings, by nature, desire justice, and will tend to cooperate in or-
der to fulfill it. If human beings exploit the Divine gift of intel-
lect and the guidance of the law of God through cooperation,
they are bound to reach a greater level of justice and moral ful-
fillment. The ruler, this school of thought argued, ascends to
power through a contract with the people pursuant to which he
undertakes to further the cooperation of the people, with the
ultimate goal of achieving a just society or, at least, maximizing
the potential for justice.77
This juristic discourse offers formidable normative possibili-
ties for democratic thought in modern Islam. In the Qur'anic
discourse, justice is asserted as an obligation owed to God, and
also owed by human beings to one another. In addition, the
imperative of justice is tied to the obligations of enjoining the
good and forbidding the evil, and the necessity of bearing wit-
ness on God's behalf. Although the Qur'an does not define the
constituent elements of justice, and in fact seems to treat it as
intuitively recognizable, the Qur'an emphasizes the ability to
achieve justice as a unique human charge and necessity.78 In
77. SHARAF & MUHAMMAD, supra note 12, at 209, 212; BARAKAT, supra note 10, at
107; RJDWAN AL-SAYID, AI-UMMA WA AL-JAMA'A WA AL-SULTAH 207-08 (1984); MAxVARDI,
supra note 28, at 116-27.
78. See RAHMAN, supra note 26, at 42-43 (discussing the obligation ofjustice in the
Qur'an); TOSHIHIKO IZUTSU, THE STRUCTURE OF ETHICAL TERMS IN THE QURAN 205-61
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essence, the Qur'an requires a commitment to a moral impera-
tive that is vague, but that is recognizable through intuition, rea-
son, or human experience. It is important here to consider
more carefully the juristic argument on the importance of
human diversity for the cooperative efforts at seeking justice.
This juristic discourse is partly based on the Qur'anic statement
that God created people different from one another and made
them into Nations and tribes so that they will come to know one
another. Muslim jurists reasoned that the expression "come to
know one another" indicates the need for social cooperation
and mutual assistance in order to achieve justice.7 9
Although the pre-modern jurists did not emphasize this
point, the Qur'an also notes that God made people different,
and that they will remain different until the end of human exis-
tence. Further, the Qur'an states that the reality of human diver-
sity is part of the Divine wisdom, and an intentional purpose of
creation."s The Qur'anic celebration and sanctification of
human diversity, in addition to the juristic incorporation of the
notion of human diversity into a purposeful pursuit of justice,
creates various possibilities for a pluralistic commitment in Is-
lam. This could also be developed into an ethic that respects
dissent and honors the right of human beings to be different,
including the right to adhere to different religious or non-relig-
ious convictions. Furthermore, the debate regarding the origi-
nal condition and the proclivity of human beings towards justice
could be appropriated into a normative stance that considersjus-
tice and diversity to be core values that a democratic constitu-
tional order is bound to protect. Furthermore, this discourse
could be appropriated into a notion of delegated powers in
which the ruler is entrusted to serve the core value of justice in
light of systematic principles that promote the right of assembly
and cooperation and the right to dissent in order to enhance the
fulfillment of this core value. Even more, a notion of limits
could be developed that would restrain the government from de-
railing the quest for justice or from hampering the right of the
people to cooperate, or dissent, in this quest. Importantly, if the
(2000); MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE (1984) (discussing the
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government fails to discharge the obligations of its covenant,
then it loses its legitimate claim to power.
This, however, is wishful thinking because there are several
factors that militate against the fulfillment of these possibilities
in modern Islam. First, modern Muslims, themselves, are hardly
aware of the Islamic interpretive tradition on justice. Both the
apologetic and puritan orientations, which are the two predomi-
nant trends in modern Islam, have largely ignored the paradigm
of human diversity and difference as a necessary means to the
fulfillment of the imperative of justice. Second, as discussed
above, the conception and role of the government or Caliphate
remained rather vague in Islamic practice. The third factor, and
the more important one, is that even if modern Muslims reclaim
the interpretive traditions of the past on justice, the fact is that,
at the conceptual level, the constituent elements of justice were
not explored in Islamic doctrine. Justice, as a moral value, has
an intuitive appeal, but it is also a vague concept. The question
in this regard is: if one demands justice, what specific conditions
is one demanding? The possibilities are many: they could in-
clude a restoration of rights pursuant to a particular vision of
rights; equality of entitlements; equality of opportunities; a pro-
portional balance between duties and rights; and so on.
In order for the demand for justice to have any specific
meaning, it is necessary to investigate the particular factors that
are material to a state of justice. But there is a tension between
the obligation of implementing the Divine law and the demands
for justice, and that is the tension produced by the process of
definition. To put it bluntly, does the Divine law define justice
or does justice define the Divine law? If it is the former, then
whatever one concludes is the Divine law therein is justice. If it
is the latter, then whatever justice demands is, in fact, the de-
mand of the Divine. Put differently, if the organizing principle
of society is the Divine law, the risk is that the subjectively deter-
mined Divine law becomes the embodiment of justice. Under
this paradigm, there is no point in investigating the constituent
elements of justice: there is no point in investigating whether
justice means equality of opportunities or results, or whether it
means maximizing the potential for personal autonomy, or per-
haps the maximization of individual and collective utility, or the
guarding of basic human dignity, or even the simple resolution
of conflict and the maintenance of stability, or any other concep-
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tion that might provide substance to a general conception ofjus-
tice. There is no point in engaging in this investigation because
the Divine law preempts any such inquiry. The Divine law pro-
vides particularized positive enactments that exemplify, but do
not analytically explore, the notion ofjustice. Conceptually, the
organized society is no longer about the right to assembly, the
right of cooperation, or the right to explore the means to justice,
but simply about the implementation of the Divine law. This
brings us full circle to the problem identified above, which is
that the implementation of the Divine law does not necessarily
amount to the existence of limited government, rule of law, or
even the protection of basic individual rights.
It is important to note, however, that considering the pri-
macy of justice in the Qur'anic discourse, the notions of human
vicegerency in the Qur'anic discourse, and the Divine charge of
justice delegated to humanity at large, it is plausible to maintain
that justice is what ought to control and guide all human inter-
pretive efforts at understanding the law. This requires a serious
paradigm shift in Islamic thinking. In my view, justice, and
whatever is necessary to achieve justice, is a Divine imperative
and is what represents the supremacy and sovereignty of the Di-
vine. God describes God's self as inherently just, and the Qur'an
asserts that God has decreed mercy upon God's-self."' Further-
more, the very purpose of entrusting the Divine message to the
Prophet Muhammad was to give a gift of mercy to human be-
ings." In the Qur'anic discourse, mercy is not simply forgive-
ness, or the willingness to ignore the faults and sins of people.83
Mercy is a state in which the individual is able to be just with
himself or herself, and with others, by giving each their due.
Fundamentally, mercy is tied to a state of true and genuine per-
ception - that is why, in the Qur'an, mercy is coupled with the
81. Id. 6:12; 54.
82. See id. 21:107 (addressing the Prophet: "We have not sent you except as a
mercy to human beings"). See generally QUR'AN 16:89. In fact, the Qur'an describes the
whole of the Islamic message as based on mercy and compassion. Islam was sent to
teach and establish these virtues among human beings. I believe that as to Muslims, as
opposed to Islam, this creates a normative imperative of teaching mercy. See generally
QUR'AN 27:77; 29:51; 45:20. But to teach mercy is impossible unless one learns it, and
such knowledge cannot be limited to text. It is ta'aruf [the knowledge of the other],
which is premised on an ethic of care that opens the door to learning mercy, and in
turn teaching it.
83. In Qur'anic terms, rahma [mercy] is not limited to maghfira [forgiveness].
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need for human beings to be patient and tolerant with each
other.8 4 Most significantly, diversity and differences among
human beings are claimed in the Qur'anic discourse as a
merciful Divine gift to humankind. 5 Genuine perception that
enables persons to understand and appreciate, and become en-
riched by the difference and diversity of humanity is one of the
constituent elements for the founding of a just society, and for
the achievement of justice.
The Divine charge to human beings at large, and Muslims
in particular, is, as the Qur'an puts it, "to know one another"
and utilize this genuine knowledge in an effort to pursue justice.
This, in my view, means that the Divine mandate for a Muslim
polity is to pursue the fulfillment of justice through the adher-
ence to the need for mercy.8 6 Although co-existence is a basic
necessity for mercy, in order to pursue a state of real knowledge
of the other and aspire for a state of justice, it is imperative that
human beings cooperate in seeking the good and beautiful and
that they do so by engaging in a purposeful moral discourse. 7
84. See QUR'AN 90:17; 43:32. The Qur'an explicitly commands human beings to
deal with one another with patience and mercy and not to transgress their bounds by
presuming to know who deserves God's mercy and who does not. See generally JOAN C.
TRONTO, MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE 101-55
(1994). An Islamic moral theory focused on mercy as a virtue will overlap with the ethic
of care developed in Western moral theory.
85. See QUR'AN 11:118-19. See also 1 ISMA'IL IBN MUHAMMAD JARRAHI, KASHF AL-
KHAFA' WA-MUZIL AL-ILBAS 'AMMA ISHTAHARA MIN AL-AHADITH 'ALA ALSiNAT AL-NAS 66-68
(Mu'assasat al-Risalah 1983). This idea is also exemplified in a tradition attributed to
the Prophet asserting that the disagreement and diversity of opinion of the umma (Mus-
lim Nation) is a source of divine mercy for Muslims. Whether the Prophet actually
made this statement or this statement is part of the received wisdom that guided the
diverse and often competing interpretive traditions within Islam is beside the point.
The point is that this tradition, Prophetic or not, was used to justify an enormous
amount of diversity within the Islamic juristic tradition, and it played an important role
in preventing the emergence of a single voice of authority within the Islamic tradition.
See generally THE SOLDIERS, supra note 20, at 23-36.
86. See generally GLEN NEWEY, VIRTUE, REASON AND TOLERATION 85-114 (1999) (dis-
cussing tolerance as a moral virtue and its limits); JAY NEWMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF RELIG-
IOUS TOLERANCE (1982); HANS OBERDIEK, TOLERANCE: BETWEEN FORBEARANCE AND Ac-
CEPTANCE (2001). See also George Fletcher, The Instability of Tolerance, in TOLERATION:
AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 158-72 (David Heyd ed., 1996) [hereinafter TOLERATION); Gordon
Graham, Tolerance, Pluralism, and Relativism, in TOLERATION, supra, at 44-59; John Hor-
ton, Toleration as a Virtue, in TOLERATION, supra, at 28-43; ROBERT McKiM, RELIGIOUS
AMBIGUrrY AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY (2001); T.M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of Tolerance, in
TOLERATION, supra, at 226-39; Bernard Williams, Toleration: An Impossible Virture?, in
TOLERATION, supra, at 18-27.
87. See DANIEL VOKEY, MORAL DISCOURSE IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD (2001). See also
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The more the good and beautiful is approached, the closer a
polity comes to a state of divinity. Significantly, however, imple-
menting legalistic rules, even if such rules are the product of the
interpretation of Divine texts, is not sufficient for the achieve-
ment of genuine perception of the other, mercy, or, ultimately,
justice. The paradigm shift of which I speak requires that the
principles of mercy and justice become the primary Divine
charge. In this paradigm, God's sovereignty lies in the fact that
God is the source and authority that delegated to human beings
the charge to achieve justice on earth by fulfilling the virtues
that are approximations of divinity." Far from negating human
subjectivities through the mechanical enforcement of rules, such
subjectivities are accommodated and even promoted to the ex-
tent that they contribute to the fulfillment of justice. Signifi-
cantly, according to the juristic discourses, it is not possible to
achieve justice unless every possessor of a right [haqq] is granted
his or her right. As discussed below, God has certain rights,
humans have rights, and both God and humans share some
rights. The challenge of vicegerency is first to recognize that a
right exists, then to understand who is the possessor of such a
right, and, ultimately, to allow the possessor of a right to enjoy
the prescribed right. A society that fails to do so, regardless of
the deluge of rules it may apply, is not a merciful or just soci-
ety. 9 This puts us in a position to explore the possibility of indi-
vidual rights in Islam.
Alan Gewirth, Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge?, in CULTURAL PLURALISM
AND MORAL KNOWLEDGE 22-43 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that cul-
tural pluralism is not necessarily inconsistent with rational moral knowledge);
MICHELLE MOODY-ADAMS, FIELDWORK IN FAMILIAR PLACES: MORALITY, CULTURE, AND PHI-
LOSOPHY (1997) (using a similar approach to Daniel Vokey).
88. Of course, approximating the Divine does not mean aspiring to become Di-
vine. Approximating the Divine means visualizing the beauty and virtue of the Divine,
and striving to internalize as much as possible of this beauty and virtue. I start with the
theological assumption that God cannot be comprehended or understood by the
human mind. God, however, teaches moral virtues that emanate from the Divine na-
ture, and that are also reflected in creation. By imagining the possible magnitudes of
beauty and its nature, human beings can better relate to the Divine. The more humans
are able to relate to the ultimate sense of goodness, justice, mercy, and balance, which
embody Divinity, the more they are able to visualize or imagine the nature of Divinity,
and the more they are able to model their own sense of beauty and virtue as approxima-
tions of Divinity.
89. See DAVID S. ODERBERG, MORAL THEORY 53-63 (2000) (discussing the relation-
ship between justice and human rights); HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 224-48
(1994) (explaining the relationship between justice and human rights).
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VII. THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE IN ISLAM
All constitutional democracies afford protections to a partic-
ular set of individual interests, such as freedom of speech and
assembly, equality before the law, right to property, and due pro-
cess of law, but which exact rights ought to be protected, and to
what extent, is subject to a large measure of variation in theory
and in practice. There is also a considerable amount of debate
in democratic societies as to the sources and nature of individual
rights, as well as to whether there are inherent and absolute indi-
vidual rights, or presumptive individual entitlements that could
be outweighed by countervailing considerations.9" As far as this
Article is concerned, for the most part, by individual rights I do
not mean entitlements, but qualified immunities: the idea that
particular interests related to the well-being of an individual
ought to be protected from infringements whether perpetrated
by the State or other members of the social order, and such in-
terests should not be sacrificed unless for an overwhelming ne-
cessity. However, I doubt very much that there is an objective
means of quantifying an overwhelming necessity. Thus, I believe
that some individual interests ought to be unassailable under any
circumstances. These unassailable interests are the ones that, if
violated, are bound to communicate to the individual in ques-
tion a sense of worthlessness, and that, if violated, tend to de-
stroy the faculty of a human being to comprehend the necessary
elements for a dignified existence. Therefore, for instance,
under my conception of rights, the use of torture, or the denial
of food, shelter, or the means for sustenance, such as employ-
ment, would be a violation of an individual's rights under any
circumstances.
It is fair to say, however, that the pre-modern juristic tradi-
tion did not articulate a notion of individual rights as privileges,
entitlements, or immunities. Nonetheless, the juristic tradition
did articulate a conception of protected interests that accrue to
90. See S.I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: SOCIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 101-20 (1966); Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS (1990); LEGAL RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1997); CARL WELLMAN, A THEORY OF RIGHTS: PERSONS
UNDER THE LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND MORALS (1985). Debates on individual rights raise
questions about the nature, foundations, and universality of such rights. The historical
discontinuities of individual rights suggest that, despite the absolutist-moral overtones
of some rights-talk, individual rights are the product of complex historical processes.
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the benefit of the individual. In order to better understand the
idea of protected interests in Islamic law, it is important to note
that the purpose of Shari'ah in jurisprudential theory is to fulfill
the welfare of the people [tahqiq masalih al-'ibad]. Typically,
Muslim jurists divided the interests or the welfare of the people
into three categories: the necessities [daruriyyat], the needs
[hajiyyat], and the luxuries [kamaliyyat or tahsiniyyat]. According
to Muslim jurists, the law and political policies of the govern-
ment must fulfill these interests, in descending order of impor-
tance: first, the necessities, then the needs, and then the luxu-
ries. The necessities are further divided into five basic values: al-
daruriyyat al-khamsah: religion, life, intellect, lineage or honor,
and property. 91 But Muslim jurists did not develop the five basic
values as conceptual categories and then explore the theoretical
implications of each value; rather, they pursued what can be de-
scribed as an extreme positivistic approach to these rights. Mus-
lim jurists examined the existing positive legal injunctions that
arguably can be said to serve each of these values, and concluded
that by giving effect to these specific legal injunctions, the five
values have been sufficiently served. So, for example, Muslim
jurists contended that the prohibition of murder in Islamic law
served the basic value of life, that the law of apostasy protected
religion, that the prohibition of intoxicants protected the intel-
lect, that the prohibition of fornication and adultery protected
lineage, and that the right of compensation protected the right
to property.92 It is important for modern Muslims to concede
that limiting the protection of the intellect to the prohibition
91. See MUHAMMAD ABU ZAHRAH, USUL AL-FIQH 291-93 (Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi 1957);
1 ABU HAMID AL-GHAZZALI, AL-MUSTASFA MIN 'ILM AL-USUL 286-87 (Mu'assasat al-Risalah
1997); KAMALI, supra note 52, at 271-73; AHMAD IBN IDRIS QARAFI, SHARH TANQIH AL-
FUSUL FI IKHTISAR AL-MAHSUL F! AL-USUL 391 (Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyah 1973)
[hereinafter QARAFI, SHARH); 5 FAKHR AL-DIN MUHAMMAD BN 'UMAR RAZI, AL-MAHSUL Fl
IILM USUL AL-FIQH 159-60 (n.p. 1997); ZAKI AL-DIN SHA'BAN, USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI 382
(Dar al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyah 1967); 2 IBRAHIM IBN MUSA SHATIBI, AL-MUWAFAQAT F1 USUL
AL-SHARI'AH 7-8 ('Abd Allah Daraz & Muhammad 'Abd Allah Daraz eds., Dar al-Kutub
al-'Ilmiyya n.d.); WAHBAH ZUHAYLI, AL-WASIT FI USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMi 500-01 (Dar al-
Fikr 1969).
92. ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 91, at 291-93; MUHAMMAD 'UBAYD ALLAH AS'ADI, AL-
MUJAZ F1 USUL AL-FIQH 247 (Dar al-Salam 1990); BADRAN ABU AL-'AYNAYN BADRAN, USUL
AL-FIQH 430-31 (Dar al-Ma'arif 1965); ZAKARIYA BARRI, USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI 144-45
(Dar al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyah 1974); 'AL HASAB ALLAH, USUL AL-TASHPI' AL-ISLAMi 260
(Dar al-Ma'arif 1971); KAMALI, supra note 52, at 271-72; SHA'BAN, supra note 91, at 382-
84; ZUHAYLI, supra note 91, at 498-99.
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against the consumption of alcohol or the protection of life to
the prohibition of murder is hardly a very thorough protection
of either intellect or life. At most, these laws are partial protec-
tions to a limited conception of values, and at any case, cannot
be asserted as the equivalent of individual rights because they
are not asserted as immunities to be retained by the individual
against the world. Unfortunately, the way the juristic tradition
treated these five values amounted to denying them any theoreti-
cal social and political content and reduced them to technical
legalistic objectives. This, of course, does not preclude the possi-
bility that the basic five values could act as a foundation for a
systematic theory of individual rights in the modern age. 3
To argue that the juristic tradition did not develop the idea
of fundamental or basic individual rights does not mean that
that tradition was oblivious to the notion. In fact, the juristic
tradition tended to sympathize with individuals who were un-
justly executed for their beliefs or those who died fighting
against injustice. Jurists typically described such acts as a death
of musabara, a term that carried positive or commendable con-
notations. In addition, Muslim jurists produced an impressive
discourse condemning the imposition of unjust taxes and the
usurpation of private property by the government. 4 In fact, the
majority of Muslim jurists refused to condemn or criminalize the
behavior of rebels who revolted against the imposition of oppres-
sive taxes or a tyrannical government. 5 In addition, the juristic
tradition articulated a wealth of positions that exhibit humanita-
rian or compassionate orientations. For instance, Muslim jurists
developed the idea of presumption of innocence in all criminal
and civil proceedings, and they argued that the accuser always
carries the burden of proof [al-bayyina 'ala man idda'a].96 In mat-
93. I would argue that the protection of religion should be developed to mean
protecting the freedom of religious belief; the protection of life should mean that the
taking of life must be for a just cause and the result of a just process; the protection of
the intellect should mean the right to free thinking, expression and belief; the protec-
tion of honor should mean the protecting of the dignity of a human being; and the
protection of property should mean the right to compensation for the taking of prop-
erty.
94. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Tax Farming in Islamic Law (Qibalah and Daman of
Kharaj): A Search for a Concept, 31 ISLAMIC STUD. 5, 5-32 (1992).
95. See REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 234-94.
96. See JALAL AL-DIN 'ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-SUYUTI, AL-ASHBAH WA-AL-NAZA'IR FI
QA VA'ID WA FURU' FIQH AL-SHAFI'IYAH 53 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah 1983); SUBHI RAJAB
MAHMASANI, FALSAFAT AL-TASHRI' F1 AL-ISLAM [THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN Is-
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ters related to heresy, Muslim jurists repeatedly argued that it is
better to let a thousand heretics go free than to wrongfully pun-
ish a single sincere Muslim. The same principle was applied to
criminal cases: the jurists argued that it is always better to re-
lease a guilty person than to run the risk of punishing an inno-
cent person.97 Moreover, many jurists condemned the practice
of detaining or incarcerating heterodox groups even when such
groups openly advocated and proselytized their heterodoxy
(such as the Khawarij), and they argued that such groups may
not be harassed or molested until they carry arms and form a
clear intent to rebel against the government.98 Muslim jurists
also condemned the use of torture, arguing that the Prophet for-
bade the use of muthla [mutilations] in all situations,99 and they
opposed the use of coerced confessions in all legal and political
matters as well.'"° In fact, a large number of jurists articulated a
LAM] 294 (Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malayin 1961); 'ALl A-HtAD NADWI, AL-QAWA'ID AL-FIQHIYAH
400-01 (Dar al-Qalam 1994); AHMAD ZARQA' ET AL., SHARH AL-QAWA'ID AL-FIQHYAH 369-
89 (Dar al-Qalam 1996).
97. See IBN H-AJAR AL-'AQALANI, supra note 25, at 308; SHAWKANI, supra note 25, at
168.
98. See IBRAHIM IBN MUFLIH ET AL., AL-MUBDI' FI SHARH AL-MUQNI' 168 (al-Maktab
al-Islami 1980); El Fadl, Law of Duress in Islamic Law, 30 ISLAMIC STUD. 305, 305-50
(1991) [hereinafter Law of Duress].
99. Muslim jurists, however, did not consider the severing of hands or feet as pun-
ishment for theft and banditry to be mutilation. See 2 JALAL AL-DIN AL-SUYUTI, AL-DURR
AL-MANTHUR Fl AL-TAFSIR BI AL-NMA'THUR 305-06 (Matba'at al-Anwar al-Muhammadiyya
n.d.); 2 ISMA'IL IBN 'UMAR IBN KATHIR, TAFSIR AL-QUR'AN AL-'AzIM 56-57 (Dar al-Khayr
1990); 2 ABU BAKR MUHAMMAD IBN ZAKARIYA RAZI, KITAB AHKAM AL-QUR'AN 407-08 (Dar
al-Kitab al-'Arabi 1986); 1 AHmLAD IBN MUHAMMAD SAWi, HASHIVAT AL-'ALLAMAH AL-SAWI
'ALA TAFSIR AL-JALALAIN 280 (Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi n.d.); MAHMUD IBN 'ABD AL-
LAH ALUSi, RUH AL-MA'ANI FI TAFSIR AL-QUR'AN AL-'AZIM WA-AL-SAB' AL-MATHANI 121-22
(Dar Ihya' Turath al-'Arabi 1985); 5 ABu JA'FAR MUHAMMAD IBN JARIR AL-TABARI, JAM!'
AL-BAYAN Fl TAFSIR AL-QUR'AN 134-35 (Dar al-Ma'rifah 1989); 3 'ALI IBN MUHAMMAD KIYA
AL-HARASI, AHKAM AL-QUR'AN 65 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1985); 2 ABu BAKR MUHAM-
MAD IBN AL-'ARABI, AHKAM AL-QUR'AN 594 ('Ali Muhammad al-Bajawi ed., Dar al-Jil
1987); 6 ABU 'ABD ALLAH MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD AL-ANSARI AL-QURTUBI, AL-JAMI' LI
AHKAM AL-QUR'AN 149-50 (n.p. 1952); 1 'ABD AL-RAHMAN IBN MUHAMMAD AL-THA'ALIBI,
AL-JAWAHIR AL-HISAN F TAFSIR AL-QUR'AN 459 (Mu'assasat al-A'lami li al-Matbu'at n.d.); I
QUTB AL-DIN SA'ID IBN HIBAT ALLAH AL-RAWANDI, FIQH AL-QUR'AN 366 (al-Sayyid Ahmad
al-Husayni ed., Matba'at al-Wilayah 1405 AH); 12 ABU MUHAMMAD 'ALI IBN AHMAD IBN
SA'ID IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLA BI-AL-ATHAR 285-88 ('Abd al-Ghaffar Sulayman al-Bandari
ed., Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah n.d.); REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, supra note 12, at 32, 50-57,
73-77, 340-41.
100. A considerable number ofjurists in Islamic history were persecuted and mur-
dered for holding that a political endorsement (bay'a) obtained under duress is invalid.
Muslim jurists described the death of these scholars under such circumstances as a
death of musabara. This had become an important discourse because Caliphs were in
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doctrine similar to the American exculpatory doctrine, which
provides that confessions or evidence obtained under coercion
are inadmissible at trial. Interestingly, some jurists even asserted
that judges who rely on a coerced confession in a criminal con-
viction may be held liable for the wrongful conviction. Most ar-
gued that the defendant, or his family, may bring an action for
compensation against the judge, individually, and against the Ca-
liph and his representatives, generally, because the government
is deemed to be vicariously liable for the unlawful behavior of its
judges. '
Perhaps the most intriguing discourse on the subject in the
juristic tradition is that which relates to the rights of God and the
rights of people. The rights of God [huquq Allah] are rights re-
tained by God, as His own, through an explicit designation to
that effect.'1 2 These rights belong to God in the sense that only
God can say how the violation of these rights may be punished
the habit of either bribing or threatening notables and jurists to obtain their bay'a. See
1 IBN KHALDUN, AL-MUQADDIMA 165 (Sinbad 1978); REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, supra
note 12, at 86-87. On the Islamic law of duress and on coerced confessions and political
commitments, see Law of Duress, supra note 98, at 305-50.
101. See AHMAD IBN 'UMAR KHASSAF, KITAB ADAB AL-QADi 364-65 (Farhat Ziyadah
ed., American University of Cairo Press 1978); l'AL IBN MUHAMMAD MAWARDI, ADAB AL-
QADI 233 (Muhyi Hilal al-Sarhan ed., Matba'at al-Irshad 1971); MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM
supra note 30, at 58; 1 'ALl IBN MUHAMMAD SIMANANI, RAWDAT AL-QUDAH WA TARIQ AL-
NAJAH 157-58 (Mu'assasat al-Risala 1984); 6 NIZAM ET AL., AL-FATAWA AL-HINDIYAH FI
MADHHAB AL-IMAM ABI HANIFAH AL-Nu'MAN 430 (Dar lhya' al-Turath al-'Arabi 1986); 3
FAKHR AL-DIN 'UTHMAN IBN 'ALl AL-ZAYLA'I, TABYIN AL-HAQA'IQ: SHARH KANZ AL-DAQA'IQ
240 (Dar al-Kitab al-Islamiyah n.d.).
102. Classicaljurists would normally list most acts of worship, and Qur'anically pre-
scribed criminal punishments as part of the rights of God. Accordingly, fasting during
the month of Ramadan, praying five times a day, or the punishment for adultery, for
example, are parts of the rights of God. The punishment for theft was often designated
as a mixed right. Another important distinction in the classical sources was the differ-
entiation between acts of 'ibadat [worship] and rnu'amalat [conduct involving social in-
teraction]. 'Ibadat, in most occasions, were designated as implicating the rights of God,
while most mu'amalat were designated as implicating the rights of people. While 'ibadat
were considered unchangeable and personal between the individual and God,
mu'amalat were considered changeable, negotiable, and within the realm of human dis-
cretion. Significantly, modern day puritans have tried to blur the distinction between
the two categories, claiming that all conduct, including social interactions, fall within
the realm of 'ibadat, and then claiming that the State is responsible for enforcing the
rights of God on this earth, and that the rights of God take priority over the rights of
people. This is quite a shift from the traditional categories of Islamic law because it
effectively injects the State in the relationship between individuals and God. In my
opinion, it even amounts to the dethroning of God, as the State comes to sit in God's
place.
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and only God has the right to forgive such violations.10 3 These
rights are, so to speak, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and
dominion of God, and human beings have no choice but to fol-
low the explicit and detailed rules that God set out for the han-
dling of acts that fall in God's jurisdiction. In addition, in the
juristic theory, all rights not explicitly retained by God, accrue to
the benefit of human beings. In other words, any right [haqq]
that is not specifically and clearly retained by God becomes a
right retained by people. These are called huquq al-'ibad, or hu-
quq al-nas, or huquq al-adamiyyin.'°4 Importantly, while violations
of God's rights are only forgiven by God through adequate acts
of repentance, the rights of people may be forgiven only by the
people. For instance, according to the juristic tradition, a right
to compensation is retained individually by a human being and
may only be forgiven by the aggrieved individual. The govern-
ment, or even God, does not have the right to forgive or com-
promise such a right of compensation if it is designated as part
of the rights of human beings. Therefore, the Maliki jurist Ibn
al-'Arabi (d. 543/1148) states:
The rights of human beings are not forgiven by God unless
the human being concerned forgives them first, and the
claims for such rights are not dismissed [by God] unless they
are dismissed by the person concerned .... The rights of a
Muslim cannot be abandoned except by the possessor of the
right. Even the imam (ruler) does not have the right to de-
mand [or abandon] such rights. This is because the imam is
not empowered to act as the agent for a specific set of individ-
uals over their specific rights. Rather, the imam only repre-
sents people, generally, over their general and unspecified
rights. 10 5
103. Some modern Muslim commentators tried to equate the rights of God with
the idea of public rights. Muhammad Abu-Hassan, Islamic Criminal Law, inJUSTICE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN IsLAMIC LAW 79-89 (Gerald E. Lampe ed., 1997); SHtmAJn SHAUKAT
HUSSAIN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM 38-39 (1990); MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION IN ISLAM 10 (rev. ed., Islamic Texts Soc'y 1997). This argument is unten-
able and it is based on a misunderstanding of the theory behind the concept of God's
rights. See Fazlur Rahman, The concept of haad in Islamic Law, 4 ISLAMIC STUD. 237, 237-
51 (1965) (providing a Muslim critique of God's rights as the equivalent of public
rights).
104. See ABU ZAHRAH, supra note 91, at 256-58; BERNARD WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF IS-
LAMIC LAw 181-84 (1998); KAMALI, supra note 52, at 348-50.
105. See 2 ABU BAKR MUHAMMAD B. 'ABD ALLAH B. AL-'ARABI, AHKAM AL-QUR'AN 603
('Ali Muhammad al-Bajawi ed., Dar al-Ma'rifah n.d.); KHALED ABOU EL FADL, CONFER-
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In a similar context, the Hanafi jurist al-'Ayni (d. 855/1451) ar-
gues that the usurper of property, even if a government official
[al-zalim], will not be forgiven for his sin, even if he repents a
thousand times, unless he returns the stolen property. 10 6 Most
of these discourses occur in the context of addressing personal
monetary and property rights, but they have not been extended
to other civil rights, such as the right to due process or the right
to listen, to reflect, and to study, which may not be violated by
the government under any circumstances. This is not because
the range of the rights of people was narrow; quite to the con-
trary, it is because the range of these rights was too broad.
It should be recalled that people retain any rights not ex-
plicitly reserved by God. Effectively, since the rights retained by
God are quite narrow, the rights accruing to the benefit of the
people are numerous. The juristic practice has tended to focus
on narrow legal claims that may be addressed through the
processes of law rather than on broad theoretical categories that
were perceived as non-justiciable before a court. As such, the
jurists tended to focus on tangible property rights or rights for
compensation instead of focusing on moral claims. So, for in-
stance, if someone burns another person's books, that person
may seek compensation for destruction of property, but he
could not bring an action for injunctive relief preventing the
burning of the books in the first place. Despite this limitation,
the juristic tradition did, in fact, develop a notion of individual
claims that are immune from governmental or social limitation
or alienation.
There is one other important aspect that needs to be ex-
plored in this context. Muslim jurists asserted the rather surpris-
ing position that if the rights of God and rights of people (mixed
rights) overlap, in most cases, the rights of people should pre-
vail. The justification for this was that humans need their rights,
and need to vindicate those rights on earth. God, on the other
ENCE OF THE BooKs 105-08 (2001); see also, 6 ABU 'ABo ALLAH MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD AL-
ANSARI AL-QURTUBI, AL-JAMI' LI AHKAM AL-QUR'AN 103 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya 1993);
HASAB ALLAH, supra note 92, at 293-7; AHMAD FARRAJ HUSAYN, USUL AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI
405-15 (al-Dar al-Jam'iyya 1986); AHMAD IBN 'ABD AL-14ALIM IBN TAYMIYAH, AL-SIYASAH AL-
SHAR'1YAH FI ISLAH AL-RA'I WA-AL-RA'IYYA 65-144 (Dar al-Kutub a-'Ilmiyah 1988);
LAMBTON, supra note 12, at 19-20.
106. See 6 BADR AL-DIN MAHMUD IBN AHMAD 'AvNi, AL-BINAYAH Fl SHARH AL-HIDAYAH
482 (Dar al-Fikr 1990).
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hand, asserts God's rights only for the benefit of human beings,
and, in all cases, God can vindicate God's rights in the Hereafter
if need be. As to the rights of people, Muslim jurists did not
imagine a set of unwavering and general rights that are to be
held by each individual at all times. Rather, they thought of in-
dividual rights as arising from a legal cause brought about by the
suffering of a legal wrong. A person does not possess a right
until he or she has been wronged and, as a result, obtains a claim
for retribution or compensation.
Shifting paradigms, it is necessary to transform the tradi-
tional conceptions of rights to a notion of immunities and enti-
tlements. As such, these rights become the property of individ-
ual holders, before there arises a specific grievance and regard-
less of whether there is a legal cause of action. The set of rights
that are recognized as immutable and invariable are those that
are necessary to achieve a just society while promoting the ele-
ment of mercy. In my view, these must be the rights that guaran-
tee the physical safety, and moral dignity of a human being. It is
quite possible that the relevant individual rights are those five
values mentioned above, but this issue needs to be re-thought
and re-analyzed in light of the current diversity and particularity
of human existence. The fact that the rights of people take pri-
ority over the rights of God, on this earth, necessarily means that
a claimed right of God may not be used to violate the rights of
human beings. God is capable of vindicating whichever rights
God wishes to vindicate in the Hereafter. On this earth, we con-
cern ourselves only with discovering and establishing the rights
that are needed to enable human beings to achieve a just life,
while, to the extent possible, honoring the asserted rights of
God. 107 In this context, the commitment to human rights does
not signify a lack of commitment to God, or a lack of willingness
to obey God. Rather, human rights become a necessary part of
celebrating human diversity, honoring the vicegerents of God,
achieving mercy, and pursuing the ultimate goal of justice.
Interestingly enough, it is not the pre-modern juristic tradi-
tion that poses the greatest barrier to the development of indi-
107. This idea is reflected in the well-known tradition attributed to the Prophet
that whenever God commands humans to do something, then they should do of it as
much as they can. This tradition represents further recognition of the contingent and
aspirational nature of human ability, and that while humans may strive for perfection,
God is perfection itself.
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vidual rights in Islam. Rather, the most serious obstacle comes
from modern Muslims themselves. Especially in the last half of
the past century, a considerable number of Muslims have made
the unfounded assumption that Islamic law is concerned prima-
rily with duties, and not rights, and that the Islamic conception
of rights is collectivist, not individualistic.108 Both assumptions,
however, are not based on anything other than cultural assump-
tions about the non-Western "other." It is as if the various inter-
preters decided on what they believe is the Judeo-Christian, or
perhaps Western, conception of rights, and then assumed that
Islam must necessarily be different. °9 In the 1950s and 1960s,
most Muslim countries, as underdeveloped nations, were heavily
influenced by Socialist and national development ideologies,
which tended to emphasize collectivist and duty-oriented con-
ceptions of rights. Therefore, many Muslim commentators
claimed that the Islamic tradition necessarily supports the aspira-
tions and hopes of what is called the Third World. But such
claims are as negotiative, re-constructive, and inventive of the Is-
lamic tradition as any particular contemporaneous vision of
rights. The reality is that both claims of individual rights or col-
lectivist rights are largely anachronistic.
Pre-modern Muslim jurists did not assert a collectivist vision
of rights, in the same way that they did not assert an individualis-
tic vision of rights. They did speak of al-haqq al-'amm [public
rights], and they often asserted that public rights ought to be
given preference over private entitlements. But as a matter of
juristic determination, this amounted to no more than an asser-
tion that the many should not be made to suffer for the entitle-
ments of the few. For instance, as a legal maxim, this was uti-
lized to justify the notion of public takings or the right to public
easements over private property. This principle was also utilized
in prohibiting unqualified doctors from practicing medicine.110
But as noted above, Muslim jurists did not, for instance, justify
108. For this often-repeated claim, see LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM 7,
79-80, 156-57 (2000); W7EISS, supra note 104, at 145-85; RHODA HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 92-104 (1995).
109. For the claim that the human rights tradition isJudeo-Christian in origin, see
CLAUDIO F. BENEDI, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE THEME OF OUR TIMES 27-32 (1997).
110. SALIM RUSTUM BAZ, SHARH AL-MAJALLAH 31 (Dar Ihya' al-Turath al-'Arabi
1986). Muslimjurists also asserted that specific rights and duties should be given prior-
ity over general rights and duties. But, again, this was a legal principle that applied to
laws of agency and trust. Id. at 43-44. Although the principle could be expanded and
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the killing or the torture of individuals in order to promote the
welfare of the State or the public interest. Even with regard to
public takings or easements, the vast majority of Muslim jurists
maintained that the individuals affected are entitled by the State
to compensation equal to the fair market value of the property
taken.
In addition, pursuant to ajustice perspective, one can argue
that a commitment to individual rights, taken as a whole, will
accrue to the benefit of the many (the private citizens) over the
few (the members of ruling government). I do believe that the
common good is greatly enhanced, and not hampered, by the
assertion of individual rights, but a separate study is needed to
develop this point in a more systematic way."' My point here,
however, is that the juristic notion of public rights does not nec-
essarily support what is often described as a collectivist view of
rights. 112 Likewise, the idea of duties [wajibat] is as well estab-
lished in the Islamic tradition as the notion of rights [huquq].
Indeed, the Islamic juristic tradition does not show a proclivity
toward the one more than the other. In fact, some pre-modern
jurists have asserted that to every duty there is a reciprocal right,
developed to support individual rights in the modern age, historically, it was given a far
more technical and legalistic connotation.
111. See YvEs RENt MARIE SIMON & VUKAN Kuic, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW:
A PHILOSOPHER'S REFLECTIONS 86-109 (1965); see also ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RGHTS:
ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS 218-33 (1982); JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 205-18 (1980).
112. It might be that someone would want to argue that collectivist rights schemes
are superior to individual rights schemes. However, a collectivist rights scheme, as
much as an individualist rights scheme, would need to be justified on Islamic grounds.
Both types of rights schemes are equally alien, or unfamiliar, to the Islamic tradition.
In addition, I do not dispute the morality of some collectivist rights, such as the rights
of indigenous people, the right to culture, or the right to development, nor do I dis-
pute that these rights could be justified on Islamic grounds. But from an Islamic per-
spective, it is much harder to justify sacrificing the safety or well-being of individuals in
pursuit of a collective right. It seems to me that the collectivist rights mentioned above
are justifiable largely when a collectivity is trying to protect its individuals and collective
interests from aggression arising from outside the collectivity. In other words, it isjusti-
fiable when a community of people, sharing common interests, is trying to protect itself
from external dangers. However, it seems far less justifiable when the community is
turning inwards, and trying to target individuals within its own membership, under the
auspices of protecting the character of the collectivity against the dangers of dissent.
See THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1992); Alexandra Xanthaki, Collective
Rights: The Case of Indigenous Peoples, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE
303-13 (Burton Leiser & Tom Campbell eds., 2001); Emily R. Gill, Autonomy, Diversity
and the Right to Culture, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 285-
300.
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and vice versa."' It is true that many jurists claimed that the
ruler is owed a duty of obedience, but ideally, they also expected
the ruler to safeguard the well-being and interests of the ruled.
The fact that the jurists did not hinge the duty to obey on the
obligation to respect the individual rights of citizens does not
mean that the jurists were, as a matter of principle, opposed to
affording the ruled certain immunities against the State. In
some situations, Muslim jurists even asserted that if the State
failed to protect the well-being of the ruled and acted unjustly
toward them, the ruled no longer owed the State either obedi-
ence or support.1" 4
Perhaps the widespread rhetoric regarding the primacy of
collectivist and duty-based perspectives in Islam points to the re-
active nature of much of the discourse on Islamic law in the con-
temporary age. From a theological perspective, the notion of
individual rights is easier to justify in Islam than a collectivist ori-
entation. God created human beings as individuals, and their
liability in the Hereafter is individually determined as well. To
commit oneself to safeguarding and protecting the well-being of
the individual is to take God's creation seriously. Each individ-
ual embodies a virtual universe of Divine miracles in body, soul,
and mind.
Why should a Muslim commit himself or herself to the
rights and well-being of a fellow human being? The answer is
that God has already made such a commitment by investing so
much of the God-self in each and every person. This is why the
Qur'an asserts that when a human kills a fellow human being
unjustly, it is as if he or she has murdered all of humanity: it is as
if the killer has murdered the Divine sanctity and defiled the
very meaning of divinity. 1 5 Moreover, the Qur'an does not dif-
ferentiate between the sanctity of a Muslim and that of a non-
Muslim.' 16 As the Qur'an repeatedly asserts, no human being
can limit the Divine mercy in any way, nor even regulate who is
113. On the relationship between duty and right in Roman law, and the subse-
quent Western legal tradition, see FINNIS, supra note 111, at 205-10. The dynamic that
Finnis describes is very similar to that which took place in classical Islamic law. See also
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Natural Law and Rights, in NATURAL LAw THEORY: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS 278-305 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) (discussing rights and responsibilities).
114. See REBELLION AND VIOLENCE, Supra note 12, at 280-87.
115. QUR'AN 5:32.
116. Some pre-modern jurists did differentiate between Muslim and non-Muslim,
especially in matters pertaining to criminal liability and compensation for torts.
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entitled to it. 11 7 I take this to mean that non-Muslims, as well as
Muslims, could be the recipients and the givers of Divine mercy.
The measure of moral virtue on this earth is proximity to divinity
through justice, and not the correct religious or irreligious label.
The measure in the Hereafter is a different matter, but it is a
matter that is in the purview of God's exclusive jurisdiction. God
will most certainly vindicate God's rights in the Hereafter in the
fashion that God deems most fitting, but on this earth, our pri-
mary moral responsibility is the vindication of the rights of
human beings. Put this way, perhaps it becomes all too obvious
that a commitment in favor of human rights is a commitment in
favor of God's creation and, ultimately, a commitment in favor
of God.
VIII. THE PROMISE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
What are the possible sources of individual rights in Islam?
In natural law theory, certain rights, derived through reason or
intuition, are considered innate and fundamental. These rights
are not subject to violation by majoritarian determinations, and
they are retained against society and State. Importantly, the nat-
ural law tradition emerged from a thoroughly religious, espe-
cially Christian, paradigm, and in fact, the retreat of natural law
before positivist theories of law occurred only after natural law
became securalized and alienated from its religious foundations.
However, this issue has become extremely complicated after the
so-called secularized natural law has experienced, thanks to the
efforts of people like John Finnis, a powerful resurgence in the
past thirty years or so, and the very meaning and connotations of
secularism have become highly contested in Western democra-
cies. But at a minimum, contrary to the assumptions of some
securalists, a belief in fundamental individual rights does not
necessarily need to be based on the exclusion of God from pub-
lic life.
Even more, a commitment to a paradigm of individual
rights need not detract from God's supremacy or dominion on
this earth. The integrity, honor, and dominion of the Divine
need not be compromised or equivocated in any fashion in or-
der for human beings' accountability for their agency to be
given full recognition. The right entitlements of human beings
117. QUR'AN 2:105; 3:74; 35:2; 38:9-10; 39:38; 40:7; 43:32.
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are simply a basic component of recognizing the direct account-
ability of individual agents to God, and not to other human be-
ings. If the individual agent does not have rights that safeguard
his ability to discharge his obligations towards God, then the in-
tegrity of the agency itself is compromised, and the whole logic
of individual accountability cannot be sustained in any serious
fashion. The integrity of the agency and the individual account-
ability of the agent mandate that the agent be free to deny his
agency and even deny God. It also mandates that the agent be
able to declare his willingness to take full responsibility for this
individual decision before God in the Hereafter. Forcing indi-
viduals to discharge the obligations of their agency toward God
renders the agency itself meaningless, because it presumes that
one agent can take responsibility for the agency of another,
which is something that the Qur'an quite clearly and explicitly
rejects. 8
In the Islamic context, the most challenging issue pertain-
ing to individual rights is not the conceptual origins of rights,
but the role of the text in relation to any claim of rights. In
Islam, the real question remains: is it possible to develop a con-
ception of rights that are fundamental, inalienable, and not sub-
ject to waiver or compromise through legal interpretation, even
if it is the interpretation of Divine text? This question recalls the
classical debate on the nature of husn [what is good or beautiful]
and qubh [what is bad or ugly]. Like the debates on the nature
of justice, the issue here was whether good and bad have an in-
herent essence that exists separate from the Divine will, or
whether they are entirely determined by God. For instance, is a
particular value good or bad because the Divine text says it is, or
is it so because good and bad have an inherent or natural es-
sence to them?" 9 If moral values such as goodness, justice, and
mercy are created and determined by the Divine will, then ar-
guably, these values are contingent and unnatural, because they
do not have an objective essence. In the classical period, the
118. The Qur'an seems to treat religious compulsion as an act that compromises
the integrity and self-evident autonomy of the truth of God. See id. 2:256; 10:99-100.
The Qur'an also repeatedly affirms the principle that no human can bear responsibility
for the accountability of another. See, e.g., id. 6:164; 17:15; 35:18; 39:7; 53:38.
119. See SPEAKING IN GOD's NAME, supra note 20, at 160-61, 168. The Mu'tazila
argued that good and bad are inherent and recognized, but not created by the Divine
text. Good and bad are realizable by reason as well as revelation.
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main argument against the idea of natural essence or inherent
values was that it conflicts with the immutability of God. If moral
values have not been generated by an act of Divine creation,
then this would mean that there is creation outside of God. Fur-
thermore, if God is bound or obliged to respect certain inherent
moral values, this would seem to challenge the absoluteness of
God's will and power. Although the idea that an immutable God
cannot be bound or limited by moral values seems plausible, it
does raise considerable difficulties.
The text of the Qur'an itself uses words such as justice,
mercy, and goodness as if they have an objectively discernable
quality. The Qur'an does not attempt to define any of these
moral values, but it does refer to them as if they are inherently
recognizable by human beings. It consistently calls upon people
endowed with a healthy intuition [yatadhakarun] or balanced ra-
tionality [ya'qilun] to recognize the existence of such moral val-
ues, and to strive to implement them. 2 ' But is God bound by
the values that God advocates? For instance, the Qur'an states,
"God has prescribed mercy upon Himself.""'' Does this mean
that mercy, as a concept, existed separate and apart from God,
and God then chose to bind Himself by it? Or does it mean that
God created a moral value, such as mercy, as binding upon His
creatures, but then decided to abide by it Himself? The verse
implies that God had the choice either to be merciful or not,
and that God chose to be merciful. However, this verse could
have various possible connotations, none of which are necessa-
rily conclusive as to the issue of natural rights. For instance, it
could be argued that God decreed mercy upon Himself because
God recognized that to do otherwise would be immoral.
The classical debate on this issue focused on whether it is
possible for God to commit ugliness, the implication being that
if God is bound by moral values, then so are human beings.' 22
The issue, for the most part, is resolved by the fact that the
120. See IZUTSU, supra note 78; ETHICO-RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS IN THE QUR'AN (1966).
121. QUR'AN 6:12, 54.
122. The Mu'tazila, in particular, contended that God could not commit evil or
ugliness. The good is recognizable through reason and revelation, and the two sources
of knowledge are always reconcilable. However, good has an objective reality that exists
in a state of nature. For two Mu'tazilite classical scholars who make systematic argu-
ments on this issue, see AL-MUHASSIN IBN MUHAMMAD IBN KARRAMAH AL-JUSHUMI AL-
BAYHAQI, RISALAT IBLIS ILA IKHWANIHI AL-MANAHIS (Hossein Modarressi ed., Dar al-
Muntakhab al-'Arabi 1995); MAHMUD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-MALAHIMI AL-KHUWARIZMI,
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Qur'an consistently describes God as endowed with moral val-
ues, such as beauty, justice, compassion, and mercy. The issue,
in my view, is not whether God is bound by moral values, for
God is the embodiment of moral values. 23 If God embodies
moral values, then exploring and seeking to understand the ob-
jective reality of morality is part of understanding the objective
reality of God. This is an issue of crucial importance, and so it
deserves to be restated and emphasized. God, in my view, is not
bound by moral virtue: God is the embodiment of moral virtue
and beauty, while moral virtues are inherent to the very concept
of divinity. If God describes God's self as just or merciful, then
God is so. In my view, God's moralities and virtues are insepara-
ble from God, and they are unalterable because God is unalter-
able. As such, God's morality is binding on all in the same way
that God is present for all. Divinity is approached, in my view,
through studying the Divine moral imperatives and not the rules
of law, because morality is prior to law in the same way that God
is prior to anything, including the text or the law. 124 Therefore,
I would argue that inalienable human rights exist not in a state
of nature, but by the fact or reality of divinity of creation. In
other words, such rights are derived not from the law of nature,
but the law of creation, which is the product of the Divine de-
sign. By asserting, for instance, that God is merciful and compas-
sionate, the text can and does help human beings understand
the law of creation.
However, there is no reason to assume that the text is the
only means for attaining such a comprehension. In fact, the
Qur'anic text, by urging people to reflect upon creation and by
inviting them to utilize their rational faculties, clearly recognizes
KITAB AL-MU'TAMAD F1 USUL AL-DIN (Martin McDermott & Wilfred Madelung eds., Al-
Hoda 1991).
123. 1 would argue that moral values, whether one considers them as characteris-
tics or as part of the essence of God, are inseparable from the manifestation of Godli-
ness. In order to understand God, one must understand the moral values that are ei-
ther at the essence of God or characterize God. Put differently, to know morality is to
know God. The law as found in the Divine text is one possible manifestation of God,
but it is not all-inclusive of the reality of God. Therefore, an inquiry into moral values -
an inquiry into the reality of God - cannot be limited to the Divine text, which is a
partial, albeit important, manifestation of God.
124. In my view, the primary commitment of a Muslim should be to God and
God's moral essence, and not to the specific rules of law. Therefore, if there is a con-
flict between the morality of a legal rule and our moral conception of God, the latter
must take priority.
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that the text is not the only means for understanding creation or
divinity. It is important to understand that the text is a part, and
not the whole, of creation, and that the part cannot be treated as
if it could abrogate the whole or render it irrelevant. 2 5 In-
stincts, intuitions, and reasoning processes of human beings, as
well as the objectively observable laws of nature, are all a part of
the Divine creation as well, and there is no reason to grant the
text a decisive and exclusive veto power over all other means to
comprehending creation. Doing so assumes that the text, which
is realizable only through subjective intepretation, is necessarily
a more reliable means to realizing the Divine or to understand-
ing creation. As far as the text is concerned, it is of crucial signif-
icance to differentiate between texts that explain creation and
texts that attempt to organize creation. The former inform the
seeker about the nature of divinity and educate on the laws of
creation, while the latter administrate an aspect of creation
within time and space limitations.
For instance, foundational texts that educate human beings
on dignity, mercy, diversity, and justice as Divine natures and
moral imperatives are quite different from organizational texts
that specify what ought to be done in a case of divorce or in a
situation involving commercial contracts. The first set of texts
elucidates the laws of creation, while the second set of texts ex-
plains the laws of society within a particular time and space di-
mension. In addition, the first set of texts is subject to a process
of moral interpretation, while the second set of texts is subject to
legal interpretations.
It is reasonable to argue that legal interpretations must ful-
fill and not negate moral interpretation. In this sense, interpre-
tations of the law of creation, in which the rights of individuals
are found, are first in the order of interpretations of the laws of
organization, and they ought to be the standard by which legal
interpretations are evaluated, rejected, or adopted. According
to this conceptual framework, the inherent and fundamental
rights of human beings that cannot be waived or denied through
legal interpretation, even if based on text, are those immunities
and entitlements that, after reflecting upon divinity, creation,
125. I am assuming that textual law is always a product of interpretation. In other
words, I am assuming that the text, Divine or not, never speaks for itself - the text
always manifests meaning through the negotiative agency of the reader of the text.
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and foundational texts, human rational faculties are able to con-
clude are mandated by the very act of creation, the need to in-
vestigate creation, and the necessity of bearing full responsibility
for one's agency before God. Pursuant to this paradigm, I do
not think it would be difficult to defend the right to think and
study, the right to believe and to speak, the right to be free from
molestation or assault, and the right to shelter and food as basic
and fundamental Islamic, human, and individual rights.
IX. DEMOCRACY AMD THE ISLAMIC STATE
In the modern age, a large number of commentators have
grown comfortable with the habit of enumerating a list of Is-
lamic concepts, such as shura, the contract of the Caliphate,
bay'a, and the supremacy of Shari'ah, and then concluding that
Islam is compatible with democracy. In my view, these types of
vacuous approaches are the product of intellectual torpor in-
duced by the rather abysmal fortunes of the Islamic heritage in
the modern age. Islamists who have pursued this superficial and
apologetic method of dealing with the challenge of democracy
in the modern age have done so largely in reaction to internal
calls for the full-fledged adoption of secularism in Muslim socie-
ties. For these Islamists, secularism has come to symbolize a mis-
guided belief in the supremacy of rationalism over faith and a
sense of hostility to religion as a source of guidance in the public
sphere. In fact, secularism is seen as originating from Western-
ized intellectuals who were themselves not religious and who
sought to minimize the role of Islam in public life. As such, sec-
ularism, known as 'ilmaniyah, is often treated as a part of the
Western intellectual invasion of the Muslim world, both in the
period of Colonialism and post-Colonialism - an invasion that is
more insidious and dangerous than the Christian Crusades. 126
While I do disagree with these reactive accusations against
the secularist paradigm, I do agree that secularism has become
an unworkable and unhelpful symbolic construct. To the extent
that the secular paradigm relies on a belief in the guidance-value
126. See generally TARIQ BISHRI, AL-HIWAR AL-ISLAMI AL-'ALMANI (Dar al-Shuruq
1996); MUHAMMAD GHAZALI, AL-GHAZW AL-THAQAFI VAMTADDU F! FARAGHINA (Dar al-
Shuruq 1998); MUHAMMAD JALAL KJSHK, AL-GHAZW AL-FIKRI (al-Mukhtar al-Islami 1975);
YUSUF QARADAWI, AL-ISLAM WA-AL-'ALMANIYAH "VAJHAN LI-WAJH (Mu'assasat al-Risalah
1997); SALAH SAWl, MUWAJAHAH BAYNA AL-ISLAM WA-AL-'ALAMANIYAH (al-Afaq al-Dawliyah
lil-Ilam 1993); TAHAFUT AL-'ALMANIYAH (al-Afaq al-Dawliyah lil-I'lam 1992).
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of reason as a means for achieving utilitarian fulfillment or jus-
tice, it is founded on a conviction that is not empirically or mor-
ally verifiable. One could plausibly believe that religion is an
equally valid means of knowing or discovering the means to hap-
piness or justice. 127 In addition, given the rhetorical choice be-
tween allegiance to the Shari'ah and allegiance to a secular dem-
ocratic State, quite understandably most devout Muslims will
make the equally rhetorical decision to ally themselves with
Shari'ah. But beyond the issue of symbolism, as noted earlier,
there is a considerable variation in the practice of secularism. It
is entirely unclear to what extent the practice of secularism re-
quires a separation of church and State, especially in light of the
fact that there is no institutional church in Islam. Put differ-
ently, to what extent does the practice of secularism mandate the
exclusion of religion from the public domain, including the ex-
clusion of religion as a source of law?128
The fact that secularism is a word laden with unhelpful con-
notations in the Islamic context should not blind us to the seri-
ousness of the concerns that secularists have about a political
order in which Shari'ah is given deference or made supreme.
Shari'ah enables human beings to speak in God's name, and it
effectively empowers human agency with the voice of God. This
is a formidable power that is easily abused, and therefore, it is
argued, that secularism is necessary to avoid the hegemony and
abuse of those who pretend to speak for God. The challenge
this poses for a democratic order is considerable because
Shari'ah is a construct of limitless reach and power, and any in-
stitution that can attach itself to that construct becomes similarly
empowered. Yet, Islamists and secularists often ignore the his-
127. See generally MILNER S. BALL, THE WORLD AND THE LAW (1993); HAROLD J.
BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); STE-
PHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIAL-
IZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993); SECULARIZATION AND SPIRITUALITY (Christian Duquoc
ed., 1969); FINNIS, supra note 111; TIMOTHY L. FORT, LAW AND RELIGION (1987); KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); SEYED HOSSEIN NASR,
ISLAM AND THE PLIGHT OF MODERN MAN (1975).
128. The literature on the history, theory, and practices of secularism is vast. Most
theoretical treatments understandably have remained wedded to the Western historical
experience. See, e.g., HARVEY Cox, THE SECULAR CITY: SECULARIZATION AND URBANIZA-
TION IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1965); HORACE M. KALLEN, SECULARISM Is THE WILL
OF GOD: AN ESSAY IN THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRACY AND RELIGION (1954);
BLANDINE KRIEGEL, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW 123-34 (1995); DANIEL CALLAHAN,
THE SECULAR CITY DEBATE (1966).
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torical facts that the 'ulama, until the modern age, never as-
sumed power directly and that Islamic law was centralized and
codified only when it came under the influence of the French
Civil Law system. Until the Ottoman Empire, no State suc-
ceeded in adopting a particular school of law as the law of the
State. Even after the Ottomans adopted Hanafism as the official
school of the State, they never managed to enforce Hanafism to
the exclusion of the others. The very idea of a centralized and
codified Shari'ah law was instigated by jurists who, educated in
the Civil law system, sought to reform and modernize Islamic law
by making it more adaptable to the needs of the modern Nation-
State. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that Shari'ah law, as
a codified State-sponsored set of positive commands, is a serious
break with tradition and a radical departure from the classical
epistemology of Islamic law.
In order to engage in a more nuanced discourse on the dy-
namics between the Shari'ah and the State, we must develop a
more sophisticated understanding of Shari'ah itself. I have re-
served this issue until the end because it was necessary to estab-
lish a sufficient foundation before engaging this topic. As part
of this foundation, it is important to appreciate the centrality of
Shari'ah in Muslim life. The pre-modern jurist Ibn Qayyim ap-
propriately captures this sentiment in the following statement
describing Shari'ah:
The Shari'ah is God's justice among His servants and His
mercy among His creatures. It is God's shadow on this earth.
It is His wisdom which leads to Him in the most exact way and
the most exact affirmation of the truthfulness of His Prophet.
It is His light which enlightens the seekers and His guidance
for the rightly guided. It is the absolute cure for all ills and
the straight path which if followed will lead to righteousness
.... It is life and nutrition, the medicine, the light, the cure
and the safeguard. Every good in this life is derived from it
and achieved through it, and every deficiency in existence re-
sults from its dissipation. If it had not been for the fact that
some of its prescriptions remain [in this world], this world
would become corrupted and the universe would be dissi-
pated .... If God would wish to destroy the world and dis-
solve existence, He would void whatever remains of its injunc-
tions. For the Shari'ah which was sent to His Prophet . .. is
the pillar of existence and the key to success in this world and
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the Hereafter.' 
29
Shari'ah is God's Way; it is represented by a set of normative
principles, methodologies for the production of legal injunc-
tions, and a set of positive legal rules. As is well known, Shari'ah
encompasses a variety of schools of thought and approaches, all
of which are equally valid and equally orthodox. 30 Neverthe-
less, Shari'ah as a whole, with all its schools and various points of
view, remains the way and law of God. The Shari'ah, for the
most part, is not explicitly dictated by God. Rather, Shari'ah re-
lies on the interpretive act of the human agent for its production
and execution. Paradoxically, however, Shari'ah is the core
value that society must serve. The paradox here is exemplified
in the fact that there is a pronounced tension between the obli-
gation to live by God's law and the fact that this law is manifested
only through subjective interpretive determinations. Even if
there is a unified realization that a particular positive command
does express the Divine law, there is still a vast array of possible
subjective executions and applications. This dilemma was re-
solved, somewhat, in Islamic discourses by distinguishing be-
tween Shari'ah and fiqh. Shari'ah, it was argued, is the Divine
ideal, standing as if suspended in mid-air, unaffected and uncor-
rupted by the vagaries of life. The fiqh is the human attempt to
understand and apply the ideal. Therefore, Shari'ah is immuta-
ble, immaculate, and flawless - fiqh is not.'
As part of the doctrinal foundations for this discourse,
129. 3 IBN QAVYIM AL-JAWZIY4nH, supra note 50, at 3. On the Shari'ah and compet-
ing comprehensive views of a moral life, see El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint
in Liberal Democracies, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1525, 152542 (1996).
130. The four surviving Sunni schools of law and legal thought are the Hanafi,
Maliki, Shafi'I, and Hanbali schools. For a discussion of the history of these schools, as
well as those that are not extinct, such as the Tabari and Zahiri schools, see CHRISTO-
PHER MELCHERT, THE FORMATION OF THE SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW, 9TH-10TH CENTURIES
C.E. (1997). For a discussion of the organization, structure, and curriculum of learn-
ing, see GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE OF COLLEGES: INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN ISLAM
AND THE WEST (1981).
131. I am simplifying this sophisticated doctrine in order to make a point. Muslim
jurists engaged in lengthy attempts to differentiate between the two concepts of
Shari'ah and fiqh. See MAHMASANI, supra note 96, at 21-24, 199-200; WEISS, supra note
104, at 119-21; ABU ZAHRA, supra note 91, at 291; MUSTAFA ZAYD, AL-MAS[AHAH Fl AL-
TASHRI' AL-ISLAMI wA-NAM AL-DIN AL-TUFI (2d ed., Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi 1964); YUSUF
HAMID 'ALIM, AL-MAQASID AL-'AMMAH LIL-SHARI'AH AL-ISLAMIYAH (Int'l Inst. Islamic
Thought 1991); MUHAMMAD IBN 'ALl SHAWKANI, TALAB AL-'ILM WA TABAQAT AL-
MUTA'ALLIMIN: ADAB AL-TALAB WA MUNTAHI AL-'ARAB 145-51 (Dar al-Arqam 1981).
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Sunni jurists focused on the tradition attributed to the Prophet
stating: "Every mujtahid (jurist who strives to find the correct an-
swer) is correct," or "Every mujtahid will be [justly] rewarded."'1 2
This implied that there could be more than a single correct an-
swer to the same exact question. For Sunni jurists, this raised
the issue of the purpose or the motivation behind the search for
the Divine will. What is the Divine purpose behind setting out
indicators to the Divine law and then requiring that human be-
ings engage in a search? If the Divine wants human beings to
reach the correct understanding, then how could every inter-
preter or jurist be correct? The juristic discourse focused on
whether or not the Shari'ah had a determinable result or de-
mand in all cases and, if there is such a determinable result, are
Muslims obligated to find it? Put differently, is there a correct
132. The Arabic is "kull mujtahid musib" and "Ii kull mujtahid nasib." See 2 MUHAM-
MAD IBN 'ALI BASRI, AL-MU'TAMAD F1 USUL AL-FIQH 370-72 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah
1983); 4 'ABD AL-'Azrz IBN AHMAD BUKHARI ET AL., KASHF AL-ASRAR 'AN Usui FAKHR AL-
ISLAM AL-BAZDAWi 30-55 (3d ed., Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi 1997); 2 GHAZZALI, AL-MUSTASFA,
supra note 91, at 363-67; 'ABD AL-MALIK IBN 'ABD ALLAH IMAM AL-HARAMAYN AL-JUWAYNI,
KITAB AL-IJTIHAD MIN KITAB AL-TALKHIS 26-32 (Dar al-Qalam 1987); 5 'ALI iBN AHMAD IBN
HAZM, AL-IHKAM FI USUL AL-AHKAM 68-81 (Dar al-Hadith 1984) [hereinafter iBN HAZM,
AL-IHKAM]; 8 IBN HAZM, AL-IHKAM, supra, at 589-92; 4 TAQI AL-DIN MUHAMMAD IBN AHMAD
IBN AL-NAJJAR, SHARH AL-KAWKAB AL-MUNIR AL-MUSAMMA BI-MUKHTASAR AL-TAHRIR, AW, AL-
MUKHTABAR AL-MUBTAKAR SHARH AL-MUKHTASAR FI USUL AL-FIQH 488-92 (Maktabat al-
'Ubaykan 1993); ABU BAKR AHMAD IBN 'ALI KHATIB AL-BAGHDADi, KiTAB AL-FAQIH WA-AL-
MUTAFAQQIH WA-USUL AL-FIQH 245-50 (Zakariya 'Ali Yusuf 1977); MAHMUD IBN ZAYD LAM-
ISHI & 'ABD AL-MAJiD TURKI, KITAB Fl USUL AL-FIQH 201-02 (Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1995);
QARAFI, SHARH, supra note 91, at 438-41; 6 RAzi, AL-MAHSUL, supra note 91, at 29-36;
MUHAMMAD IBN 'AL! SHAWKANI, IRSHAD AL-FUHUL IA TAHQIQ AL-HAQQ MIN 'ILM AL-USUL
383-89 (Dar al-Kutub al-'llmiyah n.d.); 2 ABU ISHAQ IBRAHIM IBN 'ALl [BN YUSUF
FIRUZABADI AL-SHIRAZI, SHIARH AL-LUMA' 104371 ('Abd al-Majid Turki ed., Dar al-Gharb
al-Islami 1988); ABU ISHAQ IBRAHIM IBN 'ALl IBN YUSUF FIRUZABADI AL-SHIRAZI & MUHAM-
MAD HASAN HAYrU, AL-TABSIRAH F1 USUL AL-FIQH 496-508 (Dar al-Fikr 1980) [hereinafter
SHIRAZI, AL-TABSIRAH]. In this context, Sunni jurists also debated a report attribute to
the Prophet in which he says "whoever performs ijtihad and is correct will be rewarded
twice and whoever is wrong will be rewarded once." SeeJAAL AL-DIN 'ABD AL-RAHMAN
AL-SUYUTI, IKHTILAF AL-MADHAHIB 38 ('Abd al-Qayyum Muhammad Shaft' al-Bastawi ed.,
Dar al-I'tisam n.d.); 5 IBN HAZM, AL-IHKAM, supra, at 73-74; 8 IBN HAZM, AL-IHKAM, SUpra,
at 591; AL-NUBADH F1 USUL AL-FIQH AL-ZAHiRI 119-20 (Muhammad Subhi Hasan Hallaq
ed., Dar Ibn Hazm 1993); IBN AL-QASSAR & MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HUSAYN SULAYMANI, AL-
MUQADDIMAH Fl AL-USUL 114-15 (Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 1996); 4 MAHFUZ IBN A-LMAD
KALWADHANI, AL-TAMHID FI USUL AL-FIQH 317-18 (Muhammad b. 'Ali b.Ibrahim ed.,
Markaz al-Bahth al-'Ilmi wa-Ihya' al-Turath al-Islami 1985); QARAFi, SHARH, supra note
91, at 440; MUHAMMAD IRN IDRIS SHAFI'I, AL-RISALAH 494 (Ahmad Muhammad Shakir
ed., n.d.); SHIRAZI, AL-TABSIRAH, supra, at 499; MUHAMMAD IBN 'ABD AL-HAMID USMANDI,
BADHL AL-NAZAR F1 AL-USUL 702-03 (Muhammad Zaki'Abd al-Barr ed., Maktabat Dar al-
Turath 1992).
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legal response to all legal problems, and are Muslims charged
with the legal obligation of finding that response? The over-
whelming majority of Sunni jurists agreed that good faith dili-
gence in searching for the Divine Will is sufficient to protect a
researcher from liability before God."' As long as the reader
exercises due diligence in the search, the researcher will not be
held liable nor incur a sin regardless of the result.
Beyond this, the jurists were divided into two main camps.
The first school, known as the mukhatti'ah, argued that ultimately
there is a correct answer to every legal problem. However, only
God knows what the correct response is, and the truth will not
be revealed until the Final Day. Human beings, for the most
part, cannot conclusively know whether they have found that
correct response. In this sense, every mujtahid is correct in trying
to find the answer. However, one reader might reach the truth
while the others might mistake it. God, on the Final Day, will
inform all readers who was right and who was wrong. Correct-
ness here means that the mujtahid is to be commended for put-
ting in the effort, but it does not mean that all responses are
equally valid.
The second school, known as the musawwibah, included
prominent jurists such as al-Juwayni, Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (d.
911/1505), al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d.
606/1210), and it is reported that the Mu'tazilah were followers
of this school as well. 34 The musawwibah argued that there is
no specific and correct answer [hukm mu'ayyan] that God wants
human beings to discover, in part, because if there were a cor-
rect answer, God would have made the evidence indicating a Di-
133. This juristic position is to be distinguished from the early theological school
of the Muji'a (Murji'ites) of suspension ofjudgment. The Murji'a developed in reac-
tion to the fanaticism of the Khawarij, who believed that the commission of a major sin
renders a Muslim a non-believer. The Murji'a believed that major sins are offset by
faith, and argued that punishment in the Hereafter is not everlasting. They also re-
fused to take a position on political disputes, arguing that judgment over any political
dispute ought to be suspended until the Final Day. See, A.J. Wensinck, Al-Murdji'a, in
SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IsLAM 412 (H.A.R. Gibb &J.H. Kramers eds., 1961). Most of
the jurists I am describing did not adhere to Murji'ite theology.
134. For discussions of the two schools, see 4 BUKHARI, KASHF, supra note 132, at
18; ABU HAMID MUHAMMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-GHAZZALI, AL-MANKHUL MIN TA'LIQAT AL-
USUL 455 (Dar al-Fikr 1980); 2 AL-MuSTAsFA 550-51; 2 FAKHR AL-DIN MUHAMMAD IBN
'UMAR RAZi, AL-MAHSUL FI 'ILM USUL AL-FIQH 500-08 (Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah 1988);
QARAFI, SHARH, supra note 91, at 438; ZUHAYLI, supra note 91, at 638-55; HASAB ALLAH,
supra note 92, at 82-83; BADRAN, supra note 92, at 474.
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vine rule conclusive and clear. God cannot charge human be-
ings with the duty to find the correct answer when there is no
objective means to discovering the correctness of a textual or
legal problem. If there were an objective truth to everything,
God would have made such a truth ascertainable in this life. In
most circumstances, legal truth or correctness depends on belief
and evidence, and the validity of a legal rule or act is often con-
tingent on the rules of recognition that provide for its existence.
Human beings are not charged with the obligation of finding
some abstract or inaccessible legally correct result. Rather, they
are charged with the duty to diligently investigate a problem and
then follow the results of their own ijtihad. A1-Juwayni explains
this point by asserting: "The most a mujtahid would claim is a
preponderance of belief (ghalabat al-zann) and the balancing of
the evidence. However, certainty was never claimed by any of
them (the early jurists) . . . . If we were charged with finding
[the truth] we would not have been forgiven for failing to find
it., 13 5
According to al-Juwayni, what God wants or intends is for
human beings to search and to live a life fully and thoroughly
engaged with the Divine. A1-Juwayni explains that it is as if God
has said to human beings: "My command to My servants is in
accordance with the preponderance of their beliefs. So whoever
preponderantly believes that they are obligated to do something,
acting upon it becomes My command." '136 God's command to
human beings is to diligently search, and God's law is suspended
until a human being forms a preponderance of belief about the
law. At the point that a preponderance of belief is formed,
God's law becomes, in accordance with the preponderance of
belief, formed by that particular individual. In summary, if a
person honestly and sincerely believes that such and such is the
law of God, then, as to that person that is in fact God's law.'3 7
The position of the musawwibah, the second school raises
135. AL-JUwAYN, supra note 132, at 50-51.
136. Id. at 61.
137. See 4 SAYF AL-DIN ABU AL-HASAN ET AL, AL-IHKAM Fl USUL AL-AHKAM 183 (Abd
al-Razzaq 'Afifi ed., 2d ed., al-Maktab al-Islami 1402 AH); JAMAL AL-DIN ABI MUHAMMAD
'ABD AL-RAHIM B. AL-HASAN AL-ASNAWI, AL-TAMHID Fi TAKHRIJ AL-FURU' 'ALA AL-USUL 531-
34 (3d ed., n.p. 1984); 3 MUHAMMAD B. AL-HASAN AL-BADAKHSHI, SHARH AL-BADAKHSHI
MANAHIJ AL-'UQUL MA'A SHARH AL-ASNAWi NIHAYAT AL-SUL 275-81 (1984); 2 ABU IAMID
AL-GHAZZALI, supra note 91, at 375-78; AL-JuWAYNI, supra note 132, at 41; MAHMUD B.
ZAYD AL-LAMISHI, supra note 132, at 202-03; QARAFI, SHARH, supra note 91, at 440; 6
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difficult questions about the application of the Shari'ah in soci-
ety.' 3 8 This position implies that God's law is to search for God's
law; otherwise, the legal charge [taklij] is entirely dependent on
the subjectivity and sincerity of belief. The first school (i.e., the
mukhatti'ah) indicates that whatever law is applied is potentially
God's law, but not necessarily so. 3 ' This raises the question: is
it possible for any State-enforced law to be God's law? Under the
first school of thought, whatever law the State applies is only po-
tentially the law of God. We will not find out until the Final Day.
Under the second school of thought, any law applied by the
State is not the law of God unless the person, to which the law
applies, believes the law to be God's will and command. The
first school suspends knowledge until we are finished living, and
the second school hinges knowledge on the validity of the pro-
cess and ultimate sincerity of belief.
Building upon this intellectual heritage, I suggest Shari'ah
ought to stand in an Islamic polity as a symbolic construct for the
Divine perfection that is unreachable by human effort. As Ibn
Qayyim stated, it is the epitome of justice, goodness, and beauty
as conceived and retained by God. Its perfection is preserved, so
to speak, in the Mind of God, but anything that is channeled
through human agency is necessarily marred by human imper-
fection. Put differently, Shari'ah as conceived by God is flawless,
but as understood by human beings, Shari'ah is imperfect and
contingent. Jurists should continue exploring the ideal of
Shari'ah and expounding their imperfect attempts at under-
standing God's perfection. As long as the argument constructed
is normative, it is an unfulfilled potential for reaching the Divine
Will. Significantly, any law applied is necessarily a potential un-
realized. Shari'ah is not simply a collection of ahkam [a set of
positive rules], but also a combination of principles, methodol-
ogy, and a discoursive process that searches for the Divine ideals.
As such, Shari'ah is a work in progress that is never complete.
FAKHR AL-DuN AL-RAzi, supra note 91, at 34-35, 43-50; SHA'BAN, supra note 91, at 418-19;
BADRAN, supra note 92, at 474; ZUHAYLI, supra note 91, at 643.
138. See SPEAKING IN GOD's NAME, supra note 20 (discussing the two schools of
thought more extensively).
139. I am ignoring in this context the role of ijma' [consensus] because of the
complexity of the subject. Some modern Muslims have argued that the doctrine of
consensus is the normative equivalent of majority rule. I think this is a gross over sim-
plification, and, in any case, majority rule is not the same as a constitutional democracy
that defers to majority determinations unless they violate fundamental rights.
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More specifically, ajuristic argument about what God commands
is only potentially God's law, either because in the Final Day we
will discover its correctness (the first school), or because its cor-
rectness is contingent on the sincerity of belief of the person
who decides to follow it (the second school).
If a legal opinion is adopted and enforced by the State, it
cannot be said to be God's law. By passing through the determi-
native and enforcement processes of the State, the legal opinion
is no longer simply a potential: it has become an actual law, ap-
plied and enforced. However, the law applied and enforced is
not God's law; instead, it is the State's law. Effectively, a religious
State law is a contradiction in terms. Either the law belongs to
the State or it belongs to God, and as long as the law relies on
the subjective agency of the State for its articulation and enforce-
ment, any law enforced by the State is necessarily not God's law.
Otherwise, we must be willing to admit that the failure of the law
of the State is, in fact, the failure of God's law and, ultimately,
God Himself. In Islamic theology, this possibility cannot be en-
tertained. 4 "
Of course, the most formidable challenge to this position is
the argument that God and His Prophet have set out clear legal
injunctions that cannot be ignored. Arguably, God provided un-
ambiguous laws precisely because God wished to limit the role of
human agency and foreclose the possibility of innovations. How-
ever, there is a two-part response to this argument. Regardless of
how clear and precise the statement of the Qur'an and Sunnah,
the meaning derived from these sources is negotiated through
human agency. For example, the Qur'an states, "As to the thief,
male or female, cut off (faqta'u) their hands as a recompense for
that which they committed, a punishment from God, and God is
all-powerful and all-wise." 141 Although the legal import of the
verse seems to be clear, at a minimum, it requires that human
agents struggle with the meaning of "thief," "cut off," "hands,"
140. Contemporary Islamic discourses suffer from a certain amount of hypocrisy in
this regard. Often, Muslims confront an existential crisis if the enforced, so-called, Is-
lamic laws result in social suffering and misery. In order to solve this crisis, Muslims will
often claim that there has been a failure in the circumstances of implementation. This
indulgence in embarrassing apologetics could be avoided if Muslims would abandon
the incoherent idea of Shari'ah State law.
141. QUR'AN, 5:38.
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and "recompense."' 4 2 Dealing with the fact of human agency,
the question is: whatever the meaning generated from the text,
can the human agent claim with absolute certainty that the de-
termination reached is identical to God's? Furthermore, even
assuming that the issue of meaning is resolved, can the law be
enforced in such a fashion that one can claim that the result
belongs to God? God's knowledge and justice are perfect, but it
is impossible for human beings to determine or enforce the law
in such a fashion that the possibility of a wrongful result is en-
tirely excluded. This does not mean that the exploration of
God's law is pointless. It only means that the interpretations of
jurists are potential fulfillments of the Divine will, and the laws as
codified and implemented by the State cannot be considered as
the actual fulfillment of these potentialities.
Institutionally, it is consistent with the Islamic experience
that the 'ulama can and do play the role of the interpreters of
the Divine word, the custodians of the moral conscience of the
community, and the curators reminding and pointing the nation
towards the Ideal that is God.' 4 3 However, the law of the State,
regardless of its origins or basis, belongs to the State. It bears
emphasis that under this conception, there are no religious laws
that can or may be enforced by the State. The State may enforce
the prevailing subjective commitments of the community (the
second school), or it may enforce what the majority believes to
be closer to the Divine Ideal (the first school). In either case,
what is being enforced is not God's law. This means that all laws
articulated and applied in a State are thoroughly human, and
should be treated as such. Hence, any codification of Shari'ah
law produces a set of laws that are thoroughly human. These
laws are a part of Shari'ah law only to the extent that any set of
human legal opinions can be said to be a part of Shari'ah. A
code, even if inspired by Shari'ah, is not Shari'ah: a code is sim-
ply a set of positive commandments that were informed by an
142. The Qur'an uses the expression iqta'u, from the root word qata'a, which could
mean to sever or cut off, but it could also mean to deal firmly, to bring to an end, to
restrain, or to distance oneself from. See 11 'ALLAMAH IBN MANZUR, LISAN AL-'ARAB 220-
28 (Dar al-Thabat 1997). Ahmed Ali argues that the word used in the Qur'an does not
mean to amputate a limb, but means to "stop their hands from stealing by adopting
deterrent means .... AHMAD AL, AL-QUR'AN 113 n.2 (1993). Classical jurists placed
conditions that were practically impossible to fulfill before a limb could be amputated.
143. This proposal is nonsense unless the 'ulama' regain their institutional and
moral independence.
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ideal, but the positive commandments do not represent the
ideal. Put differently, creation, with all its textual and non-tex-
tual richness can and should produce foundational rights and
organizational laws that honor and promote the foundational
rights, but the rights and laws produced do not mirror the
perfection of Divine creation.
According to this paradigm, democracy is an appropriate
system for Islam because it denies the State the pretense of divin-
ity. Moral educators have a serious role to play because they
must be vigilant in urging society to approximate God, but not
even the will of the majority can come to embody the full majesty
of God. Under the worst circumstances, if those individuals in
the majority are not persuaded and insist upon turning away
from God, as long as they respect the fundamental rights of indi-
viduals, including the right to ponder creation and call to the
way of God, they will have to answer only to God in the Hereaf-
